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CEOs and financial analysts are key agents in the financial market and attract many attentions
from different types of market participants. This dissertation contains three essays on empirical
analysis of the market for CEOs and financial analysts. Analyzing the market for these two types
of agents gives us the opportunity to understand how agents are matched, and the impact of the
matching on agents’ performances.
Chapter 2 of the thesis directly analyzes the market for CEOs itself. Previous researches on
CEO succession mainly treat it as a one-time event. However, it is a cascade of events with
different important announcements. This chapter focuses on two key events: The announcement
of incumbent CEO step down news and the announcement of new CEO identity news. Previous
researches treat both of the events happens at the same time. Based on hand-collected data on
1739 CEO turnovers, surprisingly, more than 30% of total CEO turnover in U.S. S&P 1500 firms
experience a protracted succession that these two events do not happen at the same day. Also,
contrary to the conventional view, a simple long-only strategy that buys stocks that experience
protracted succession and sale when the information of new CEOs’ identity is publicly available
yields an annual four-factor alpha of 11%. This positive return is likely to be caused by two
mechanisms: First, investors’ under-reaction to lack of news about the successor during the period
of protracted succession. Second, the internal tournament competition for CEO positions among
different senior executives.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of the thesis study the impact of two-sided matching in different
markets for CEOs and financial analysts. The two-sided matching market contains two distinct
group of agents, and they choose to match with each other based on their mutual choices. One
critical feature of the two-sided matching market is that the matching decisions of two agents
depend on their relative ranking on each side of the markets. That is, the matching decision not
only depends on their own characteristics but also on other agents’ characteristics as well. This
feature creates difficulty in estimating the matching choices because when trying to evaluate one
agent’s choice, other agents choices need to take into account as well, especially when there are
many unobserved characteristics. But on the other hand, creates sources to identify forces that are
conventionally impossible to quantify.
Chapter 3 of the thesis study the match between new CEOs and firms in a one-to-one two-sided
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matching market, and try to quantify the relative importance of two co-founding effects that lead
to new CEOs receive higher incentive pay performs better: incentivize CEOs to perform better
(incentive effect) and select a better CEO (selection effect). These two effects work in the same
direction and to disentangle them is difficult because the matching between new CEOs and firms is
a complicated process involving observed and unobserved characteristics of both parties and other
market agents. To overcome the problem, chapter 3 uses the feature of the two-sided matching
market between new CEOs and firms that other agents’ characteristics correlate with the matched
pairs’ decisions, but the outcomes do not. Therefore, if the agents’ characteristics distribution
exogenously varies across markets, these other agents’ characteristics can serve as instruments to
separate selection effect and incentive effect of incentive pay. The results show that the selection
effect accounts for 12.7% of the total impact while the incentive effect accounts for 87.3% of the
total impact. The selection effect becomes stronger in industries or period where the mobility of
CEO talent is high.
Chapter 4 of the thesis analyzes the brokerage firm reputation effect on new analysts forecast
accuracy. We find that new analysts work for better reputable brokerage firms on average issue more
accurate forecasts. Two effects could explain this positive correlation: Better reputable brokerage
firms provide better resources to help analysts forecast better; Talented analysts choose to work for
better reputable brokerage firms. By using a Bayesian approach with Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) method to estimate a structure model that contains a one-to-many two-sided matching
market, the result shows that the direct influence effect from brokerage firms accounts for 73%
of the total impact and the indirect sorting effect that talented analysts sorts on brokerage firm
reputation accounts for 27% of the total impact. The result highlights the benefit of working in
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“You can tell that I’m a lame duck because nobody’s following instructions.”
- President Barak Obama’s Farewell Address, 2017
“There is not one fiber in my body that feels like a lame duck. Nobody treats me differently, I
am still the CEO, and I am incredibly busy.”
- Joe Tucci, CEO of EMC, 2014
1 Introduction
The appropriate succession of key individuals is crucial to organizations’ performance: both
for presidents of countries and CEOs of firms. When a CEO departure is announced without a
successor, the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” Firms with lame duck CEOs are exposed
to a potential lack of leadership that may result in stalling, high levels of uncertainty, and freezes
in significant decisions. This generally negative view on protracted transitions has prompted the
SEC and other regulatory bodies around the world to increase succession planning disclosure re-
quirements.
In contrast to this view, this paper shows that firms with protracted CEO successions experience
positive abnormal returns. We document an annual four-factor alpha of 11% during the reign of
lame duck CEOs. We then examine the returns around important dates to better understand
the mechanisms that explain this positive alpha. First, the market under-reacts to the lack of
news during “lame duck” CEO reigns-that is, to the time-varying probability that a new CEO is
announced. Second, the market under-estimates the positive effects of the tournament among CEO
candidates.
Our empirical analysis is based on CEO turnovers in S&P 1500 firms from 2005 to 2014. Dur-
ing this period, there were 1,739 CEO turnover events, of which 537 (31%) are protracted CEO
successions. Specifically, for each CEO succession, we identify the first news about the CEO de-
parture (departure announcement), the first news about the successor (successor announcement),
and the date that the incumbent CEO leaves office and the new CEO takes over (departure date).
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If the successor announcement takes place after the departure announcement, we define this CEO
succession as protracted; otherwise, we define it as prompt. We then form monthly portfolios as
follows. We include a firm in the protracted succession portfolio at the beginning of the following
month after the departure announcement until the beginning of the next month after the succes-
sor announcement. We obtain the monthly four-factor alpha by calculating the protracted firm
portfolio returns after controlling for the market, size, growth, and momentum factors. Overall,
the portfolio of firms with a lame duck CEO, or protracted successions, outperforms others by an
annual four-factor alpha of 11%. This positive alpha cannot be explained by industry, observed
characteristics, or stock return volatility change associated with the turnover event.
We offer two possible explanations for the mechanisms behind the surprising positive perfor-
mance of lame duck CEOs. The first one focuses on the stock market positive abnormal returns.
We document that investors under-react to the lack of news about a successor during the period
between the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement and the successor announcement. As in
Giglio and Shue (2014), no news contains information on the probability that the firm will finish
the CEO search and appoint a successor, and investors should interpret the passage of time as
information and incorporate it into stock prices. We start by estimating a hazard model and non-
parametrically estimate the successor announcement hazard rate for the amount of time following
the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement. Then, we show that the weekly stock returns are
positively associated with the empirical hazard rate: for each 1% increase in hazard rate, the weekly
stock return will increase by 1.27%. Finally, we construct calendar-time portfolios based on firms’
hazard rates across calendar time. We find that the portfolio containing firms with high hazard
rates exhibit a monthly alpha of 1.4%, much higher than the portfolio of firms with a low hazard
rate, which has a monthly alpha of 0.5%. The results indicate that investors’ under-reaction to no
news is part of the explanation of the positive excess return during lame duck CEO periods.
The second explanation focuses on the economic mechanism driving the lame duck firm’s per-
formance. Following the incumbent CEO’s departure announcement, firms undergo a tournament
to select a successor from potential internal candidates. This internal tournament competition can
be thought of as one type of intangible assets that benefits firm value but is slowly incorporated
into stock price (Edmans, 2011). We start by creating calendar-time portfolios based on firms’
ex-ante tournament competition among executives below the CEO level. According to the tourna-
ment model Rosen (1981); Main et al. (1993), competition intensity increases when the potential
candidates share a similar probability of winning. We use inverse standard deviation among senior
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executives to measure tournament competition levels and sort firms into a high tournament port-
folio and a low tournament portfolio. The portfolio associated with high tournament competition
results in the significant positive monthly alpha of 1.5%. We also test the internal tournament
competition hypothesis by sorting the portfolios based on whether the ultimate successor is inter-
nal or external. The portfolio with internal successors is associated with more than 2% monthly
excess return. The abnormal return around earnings announcement is highest for firms with high
tournament competition and internal CEO successors.
We also explore other possible mechanisms that might explain the positive excess return dur-
ing the lame duck CEO period. We examine alphas of calendar-time portfolio returns sorts on
different turnover and on firm characteristics. We conclude that alternative explanations, such
as different motives for the incumbent CEO’s departure, and having a capable interim CEO or a
well-functioning board, are likely to explain the abnormal returns of firms with lame-duck CEOs.
Our findings contribute to the empirical literature on CEO succession planning that followed
the latest regulatory changes. Cvijanovic et al. (2017) study the effects of a formal succession plan
(based on firms’ disclosure), while Naveen (2006) and Mobbs and Raheja (2012) study the effects
of planned “relay” successions, in which a firm grooms a president or a chief operating officer as
the new CEO. We contribute to this literature by documenting abnormal returns during protracted
CEO successions.
More broadly, our findings are related to the extensive literature on causes and consequences of
CEO turnover (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Denis and Denis,
1995; Parrino, 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004; Huson et al., 2004; Eisfeldt
and Kuhnen, 2013; Taylor, 2010; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). However, unlike our analysis, most
papers in this field consider CEO turnover as a single-date event. Notable exceptions are Vancil
(1987); Shen and Cannella (2002); Naveen (2006) and Intintoli (2013), who also explore the multi-
event process of “relay” and “marathon” CEO successions, respectively. We contribute to their
findings by exploring the market reactions to these events and shedding light on the mechanisms
driving them. Because we document tournament incentives as a crucial mechanism underlying the
positive abnormal returns of lame duck CEOs, our paper also relates to the extensive literature on
tournament incentives, such as (Kale et al., 2009; Kini and Williams, 2012).1
Our study has some implications for the regulation of succession planning. In their staff legal
bulletin in 2009, the SEC advocated for firms to be aware of the potential risk of a vacancy in
1See Connelly et al. (2014) for a detailed review of the tournament theory and corresponding empirical studies.
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leadership associated with poor succession planning (SEC, 2009). Since then, the regulatory dis-
cussion on planned succession has overwhelmingly taken a one-sided view that prompt successions
are superior to protracted ones. They therefore advocate that firms be mandated or incentivized
to formally prepare for smooth CEO successions under various contingencies, increasing corporate
governance scrutiny on succession planning. Our results indicate that firms that opt for protracted
successions perform better than expected, insofar as the market underestimates some benefits of
such successions. Hence, our results do not support increased regulatory attention to CEO succes-
sion planning that guarantees prompt CEO turnovers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the practice of pro-
tracted CEO successions and presents our data and empirical methodology. Section 3 contains our
main results and robustness tests. Section 4 explores possible explanations for the positive alpha.
Section 5 discusses alternative explanations and long-run performance. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Background, Data, and Empirical Methodology
2.1 Lame-Duck CEOs Background
CEO turnover is arguably one of the most significant events for any firm and can become a
key determinant of firms’ success. The multi-period, lengthy process of CEO turnover has many
events and key dates, and includes firm-specific idiosyncrasies. However, a stylized CEO succession
process involves, at the very least, three crucial, publicly known events. First, a firm announces that
the incumbent CEO is stepping down (departure announcement). Second, the firm announces the
successor’s identity (successor announcement). Third, the incumbent CEO formally steps down,
and the new CEO officially takes over the firm’s operations (departure date). Figure (1) plots these
events.
Figure 1. CEO Turnover Timeline
This timeline plots a stylized CEO turnover event. Departure announcement is the announcement that the incumbent CEO is
stepping down. Successor announcement is the announcement of the successor’s identity. Departure date is the date when the







To understand the lame duck CEO phenomenon, we focus on the period between the incum-
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bent CEO’s departure announcement (e0) and the announcement of a successor (e1). This is the
period with the highest potential for risk, in terms of lack of leadership and stagnation, and has
been referred to publicly as a “long goodbye” (see, for example, Lublin (2004) and Lublin (2014)).
Alternatively, the lame duck period may last until e2; that is, until the new CEO takes office. We
do not include the period between the successor announcement (e1) and the point at which a new
CEO takes office (e2) in our main specification for a couple of reasons.2 First, how the period
between the successor announcement and the incumbent’s departure is defined changes depend-
ing on whether the successor is externally appointed or internally promoted, thereby potentially
clouding our results. Second, the situation changes dramatically after a new CEO is nominated:
the tournament incentives to become the next CEO disappear and the incumbent CEO focuses on
helping the new CEO to understand the firm’s operations and financial conditions. Finally, there is
no lack of leadership after e1: the new CEO may not be in office, but everyone knows who he/she
is. In short, the appointment of a new CEO affects any decision made between e1 and e2, even if
the formality of taking office has not yet taken place. After e1, any firm’s performance change is
likely to be impacted by the new CEO.
2.2 Data
We analyze CEO turnover for S&P 1500 firms during the period 2005-2014. Our sample starts
in 2005, following the SEC announcement effective August 23rd, 2004, requiring firms to disclose
any relevant information about the departure or appointment of principal executive officers within
four business days and to file the corresponding 8-K form under Section 5.02. Importantly for our
study, the SEC clarifies that this disclosure requirement is triggered by information regarding the
CEO’s employment termination, not only by actual job termination. Hence, from 2005 onwards,
we can identify “lame duck” CEOs more precisely. We only include CEO turnover data through
2014 to ensure that all of our observations are completed CEO successions. We eliminate all CEO
turnover events involving interim or acting CEOs, mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs, co-CEOs,
CEOs appointed for a term shorter than twelve months, and firms that do not have stock price
information listed in CRSP.
We then hand-collect from the Factiva database the date of the first publicly known announce-
ment that the incumbent CEO i is stepping down (ei0). Similarly, we hand-collect from Factiva the
date when the firm announces his/her successor’s identity (ei1) and the date when the incumbent
2As a robustness test, in Table 5, we repeat our main analysis by defining protracted successions as lasting until
e2, and we obtain very similar results in terms of both economic and statistical significance.
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CEO i relinquishes his/her CEO position (ei2). Then, we define a CEO’s i succession as Protracted
if ei0 takes place before ei1. Our sample includes 1,739 CEO turnovers, with 537 protracted CEO
successions. We refer to the incumbent CEO in protracted successions as a “lame duck” CEO
in the period between ei1 and ei2. Table 1 Panel A tabulates all CEO successions and protracted
successions by year. Panel B shows the summary statistics on protracted period length. Table 1
shows that the percentage of protracted successions is relatively stable across years and that the
average (median) lame duck CEO presides for 173 (142) days.
Table 1. Summary Statistics CEO turnovers
This table provides summary statistics for CEO turnovers. Panel A focuses on succession types, presenting data for All
CEO, Prompt Successions, and Protracted Successions. Prompt Successions are defined as CEO turnover cases in which the
announcement of the incumbent CEO’s resignation (e0) takes place at the same time that the firms reveals the identity of the
successor CEO (e1); otherwise, they are defined as Protracted Successions. Panel B presents detailed summary statistics for
the duration of protracted successions, the difference between e0 and e1, in days.
Panel A: Succession types
Year All Prompt successions Protracted successions
Number Number Percent(%) Number Percent(%)
2005 195 138 70.8 57 29.2
2006 181 124 68.5 57 31.5
2007 188 131 69.7 57 30.3
2008 198 140 70.7 58 29.3
2009 155 115 74.2 40 25.8
2010 149 107 71.8 42 28.2
2011 186 129 69.4 57 30.6
2012 175 109 62.3 66 37.7
2013 161 107 66.5 54 33.5
2014 151 102 67.5 49 32.5
Total 1739 1202 69.1 537 30.9
Panel B: Protracted succession duration
Year Number mean 5p 25p 50p 75p 95p
2005 57 152.3 13 131 174 174 413
2006 57 195.5 22 105 158 211 639
2007 57 144.9 4 75 118 180 360
2008 58 182.9 1 64 134 221 672
2009 40 167.4 2 83 125 172 609
2010 42 156.7 16 87 158 210 330
2011 57 202.5 29 94 141 222 695
2012 66 168.3 40 118 155 201 293
2013 54 154.7 35 101 133 200 306
2014 49 181.1 36 110 154 201 377
Total 537 173.2 19 92 142 203 440
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables in our analysis for all CEO successions,
prompt successions, and protracted successions, separately. Most notably, the industry-adjusted
return on asset is higher in prompt succession firms, with a mean value of 0.069 in prompt suc-
cession firms and 0.050 in protracted succession firms; the difference is significant at the 5% level.
Firms that experience prompt successions also enjoy higher valuation than firms with protracted
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succession, with a market-to-book difference of 0.19, significant at the 5% level. Firms with prompt
successions are 11.6% more likely to pay dividends than firms with protracted successions. This
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, on average, firms with protracted
successions have higher tournament incentives than firms with prompt successions; the mean value
is almost one time higher. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Appendix A
includes a definition of all of our variables.
Table 2. Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for all of our variables. All variables are defined in appendix A. Column (1) shows the
average value for all successions. Columns (2) and (3) show averages for prompt and protracted CEO turnovers, respectively.
Column (4) shows the two-sided t-test results for the difference in mean. In column (4) t-statistics are in parentheses. In
columns (1) through (3), standard errors are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. Our sample includes firms in the S&P 1500 from 2005 to 2014.
Difference:
All Prompt Protracted Prompt - Protracted
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total asset($bn) 19.237 18.271 21.693 -3.422
[100.909] [89.901] [124.697] (-0.951)
Ind-adj ROA 0.064 0.069 0.050 0.019**
[0.159] [0.168] [0.131] (2.249)
Leverage 0.218 0.223 0.204 0.018
[0.235] [0.248] [0.196] (1.156)
Market-to-book 1.537 1.591 1.401 0.190**
[1.532] [1.692] [1.021] (2.133)
Dividend Payer 0.560 0.593 0.476 0.116***
[0.497] [0.492] [0.500] (3.687)
CEO focus score 0.106 0.104 0.111 -0.006
[0.077] [0.078] [0.073] (-1.417)
Tournament incentive 0.024 0.019 0.037 -0.018***
[0.113] [0.022] [0.212] (-2.678)
Overall, Table 2 suggests that protracted successions are likely to occur in less profitable and
less valued firms. Protracted succession firms are also less likely to pay dividends and have higher
tournament incentives than prompt succession firms. As such, we need to control explicitly for
these characteristics in our empirical methodology. To do so, we use the Carhart (1997) four
factors obtained from the Kenneth R. French Data library.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
We construct equally weighted portfolios with monthly rebalancing based on the publicly avail-
able information for CEO succession announcements, as follows. The Protracted Succession port-
folio includes all firms currently experiencing a lame duck CEO reign: the incumbent departure
has been announced, but the new CEO identity is unknown. Specifically, we add a firm in the
Protracted Succession portfolio at the beginning of the following month after the incumbent CEO
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announces his/her departure, that is, e1. The firm remains in the Protracted Succession portfolio
until the end of the month when the new CEO identity is revealed, that is, e2. To ensure perfor-
mance is not the result of differences in risk, we control for the Carhart (1997) four-factor model
described as follows:
Rt = α+ βmkt ∗mktrft + βsmb ∗ smbt + βhml ∗ hmlt + βumd ∗momt + εi,t (1)
The dependent variable Rt is the return of the Protracted Succession portfolio in month t in
excess of a benchmark. α measures the abnormal risk-adjusted return of the Protracted Succession
portfolio. mktrft, smbt, hmlt and umdt are the returns on the market, size, value, and momentum
factors. As in Edmans (2011), we calculate the returns Rt over three different benchmarks. First,
we use the risk-free rate. Second, we use the 49 Fama-French average industry returns, which
ensures that our results are not driven by some industry-specific risk that is not captured by the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Third, we use the characteristics-adjusted benchmark by Daniel
et al. (1997), which matches each stock to a portfolio of similar firms in terms of size, value, and
momentum. This ensures that our results are not driven by the explanatory power of the Carhart
(1997) four factors. We correct the standard errors for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
using Newey and West (1987), with the optimal lag-selection method in Newey and West (1994).
We also run short-period event studies around earnings announcements during the CEO suc-
cession process. As is standard in finance literature (Brown and Warner (1985)), we use the market
model with an estimation period between -255 days to -46 days before the event. Given the short
event period window (up to a couple of days), the results are robust to alternative specifications of
expected returns.
Overall, our empirical methodology relies on market-based estimates of firm performance. We
do so to ensure that our results are not clouded by some (unobserved) factors, such as firms’ or
CEOs’ characteristics, which could otherwise bias our results. We expect market participants to
efficiently incorporate into prices any cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics that could
otherwise bias our results.
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3 Lame-Duck CEO Performance
3.1 Stock Returns
In this section, we study the performance of lame duck CEOs at firms undergoing protracted
successions. First, Figure 2 shows the cumulative abnormal returns of the Protracted Succession
portfolio, that is, it accumulates the monthly α from equation (1). We plot the results for the
cumulative abnormal returns using three different benchmarks: the risk-free rate, the 49 Fama-
French average industry returns, and the characteristics-adjusted benchmark. Second, we show
the regression equivalent in Table 3 Panel A. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the results using
the risk-free rate, the 49 Fama-French average industry returns, and the characteristics-adjusted
benchmark, respectively.3 The relative over-performance of firms with lame duck CEOs remains
constant and statistically significant across specifications, with the Protracted Succession portfolio
annualized α around 10%.
We then document that lame duck CEOs indeed drive our results, not any potential confounding
effects arising from CEO turnover. In Table 3 Panel B, we show that our results are similar when
we use a “long and short” portfolio (instead of the “long only” in Panel A) that shorts for non-lame
duck CEO successions. We call this portfolio ”Prompt Succession” and we construct it as follows.
Akin to the “Protracted Succession” portfolio, we include a firm in the portfolio at the end of the
month that news of the incumbent CEO’s departure is made public. There is no obvious holding
period for firms with prompt succession to remain in the “Prompt Succession” portfolio: as per
the prompt succession definition, the new CEO is announced jointly with the incumbent CEO
departure. We choose six months, as this is the average (and median) holding period for protracted
turnover firms. The “long and short” portfolio obtains an annualized α around 8.5%, similar to
Table 3 Panel A, both in terms of economic and statistical significance.4
3.2 Earnings Announcements
The stock return results show that there is information contained within the lame duck CEO
period, and that this information is beneficial to firm value but not incorporated into stock returns
immediately. The slow-moving information affects stock returns gradually until outsiders update
their information set. One particularly important event for outsiders’ information updating is an
3The characteristics-adjusted benchmark data ends in 2012, so we have fewer (monthly) observations.
4In untabulated tests, we repeated our analysis for holding periods of 3 and nine months, and our results are
similar both in economic magnitude and statistical significance.
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Figure 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Lame Duck CEOs
This Figure plots the cumulative abnormal return of the equally weighted long-only portfolio based on firms with protracted
successions in our main sample. Firms are added to the protracted portfolio at the end of the month that the incumbent
CEO’s resignation is announced (e0). The holding period concludes at the end of the month that firms reveal the identity of
the successor CEO (e1). The abnormal returns are based on Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The Figure plots the monthly
cumulative abnormal return of the protracted portfolio from Jan 2005 to Dec 2014 in excess of the risk free rate and the industry
average return.
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Table 3. Main results: Lame Duck CEOs Performance
This table shows the relative over-performance of firms undergoing a lame duck CEO period. The dependent variable is
the return for the Protracted Succession portfolio (that is, firms with a lame duck CEO) less either the risk-free rate, the
industry-matched portfolio return, or the characteristics-matched portfolio return in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The
table shows monthly regressions for the equally weighted portfolio on the Carhart (1997) four factors, MKT, SMB, HML, and
MOM. Panel A shows the long-only portfolio of protracted firms. Panel B shows the long-short portfolio: long the protracted
succession firms and short the prompt succession firms. α is the excess risk-adjusted return. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.




α 0.009** 0.007* 0.010**
(2.203) (1.956) (2.017)
βMKT 1.147*** 0.129 0.443**
(13.976) (1.394) (2.392)
βSMB 0.737*** 0.660*** 0.346
(5.905) (5.094) (1.083)
βHML -0.072 0.046 -0.176
(-0.531) (0.266) (-1.023)
βMOM -0.479*** -0.422*** -0.538***
(-5.784) (-4.640) (-5.281)
Observations 120 120 84
Adj. R-squared 0.789 0.396 0.320




α 0.007** 0.006* 0.013***
(2.037) (1.797) (2.740)
βMKT 0.155* 0.185** 0.175*
(1.848) (2.054) (1.663)
βSMB -0.005 0.113 -0.129
(-0.031) (0.671) (-0.533)
βHML -0.330** -0.235 -0.362**
(-2.336) (-1.487) (-2.384)
βMOM -0.198*** -0.187** -0.216
(-3.289) (-2.529) (-1.308)
Observations 120 120 84
Adj. R-squared 0.100 0.112 0.081
earnings announcement. At earnings announcements, firms release material information and answer
questions from analysts. We therefore expect significant stock price movements during those events,
especially in information intense periods, such as the reign of “lame ducks”.
Table 4 Columns (1) and (2) examine the stock return around earnings announcements for
firms in the lame duck CEO period. We calculate a three-day window abnormal return around
all earnings announcements from January 2005 to January 2015 from the I/B/E/S dataset.5 We
find that abnormal returns around earnings announcements are on average 1% higher during the
lame duck CEO period than any other period. This finding is robust when controlling for firm
characteristics similar to Pan et al. (2015). Interestingly, in column (3) and column (4), we do
not observe the mean earnings surprise is different for firms in protracted succession period. Also,
in column (5) and (6), we do not observe the median earnings surprise is different for firms in
protracted succession period. The results in Table IV seems to indicate that the information
disclosed during earnings announcements do not directly lead to (short-term) earnings increase.
However, the positive stock market reaction suggests that this disclosed information relates to
firms’ performance in the long-run.
5We estimate the abnormal returns using the market model with a -255 to -46 days estimation window. Given
the short event window, our results are robust to many alternative abnormal returns models.
15
Table 4. Main result: earnings announcement
This table shows abnormal returns around earnings announcements and analysts’ forecasts for earnings from 2005 to 2015. The
dependent variable is the three-day window cumulative abnormal returns around the earning announcements in columns (1)
and (2). Abnormal returns are calculated above a market model with a -255 to -46 day estimation window. Protracted is a
dummy variable indicating protracted successions: it has a value of 1 if the length in days between the announcement of an
incumbent CEO’s resignation (e0) and the announcement of a successor CEO (e1) is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. The
dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the firm’s quarterly earnings per share surprise when compared with the mean
level of analysts’ forecasts. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is the firm’s quarterly earnings per share surprise
when compared with the median level of analysts’ forecasts. All earnings surprises are scaled by the firm’s stock price. We
exclude all financial firms and utility firms. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
and time levels. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
CAR[-1,+1] Mean earning surprise Median earning surprise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protracted 0.010** 0.012** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.335) (2.465) (0.747) (0.861) (0.734) (0.890)
Ln asset -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-4.181) (-2.856) (-2.728)
Market-to-book 0.004*** -0.000* -0.000
(6.006) (-1.704) (-1.459)
Leverage -0.012*** 0.002 0.002
(-2.740) (1.437) (1.524)
Ind-adj ROA 0.016*** 0.011* 0.011*
(10.240) (1.881) (1.778)
Dividend payer -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-4.200) (-2.963) (-2.924)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 74,259 61,184 57,895 47,370 57,895 47,370
R-squared 0.042 0.048 0.088 0.092 0.089 0.095
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3.3 Robustness and Risk Explanation
Our main results already show that firms’ outperformance during lame duck CEO periods is
not due to their industry affiliation or matched characteristics, nor to some generic events around
all CEO turnovers. We now expand our robustness: first, we show that our results are robust to
different methodologies and holding periods; second, we show that volatility does not drive our
results.
First, we undertake a portfolio analysis similar to our main results, but extend the holding
period of protracted succession until the new CEO officially takes over the office. Table 5 shows
that the alphas for the portfolio with extended holding periods are similar to the results found in
table 3.
Table 5. Robustness: alternative holding period
This table shows a portfolio test on the different holding periods of the protracted firm portfolio. The dependent variable
is the return for the Protracted Succession portfolio (that is, firms with a lame duck CEO) less either the risk-free rate, the
industry-matched portfolio return, or the characteristics-matched portfolio return, in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The
table shows monthly regressions of the equally-weighted portfolio on the Carhart (1997) four factors, MKT, SMB, HML, and
MOM. We use our alternative definition of protracted succession, in which the holding period is redefined as extending until
the new CEO takes office. We exclude all financial firms and utility firms. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.




α 0.008** 0.006** 0.008*
(2.372) (2.123) (1.890)
βMKT 1.101*** 0.087 0.389**
(13.619) (0.946) (2.120)
βSMB 0.761*** 0.669*** 0.413
(6.572) (5.517) (1.421)
βHML -0.023 0.091 -0.139
(-0.151) (0.491) (-0.789)
βMOM -0.453*** -0.398*** -0.522***
(-5.556) (-4.500) (-5.267)
Observations 120 120 84
Adj. R-squared 0.799 0.401 0.317




α 0.006** 0.006* 0.009***
(2.065) (1.797) (3.398)
βMKT 0.109 0.143 0.133
(1.316) (1.542) (1.336)
βSMB 0.019 0.122 -0.046
(0.127) (0.825) (-0.277)
βHML -0.281* -0.190 -0.344**
(-1.904) (-1.181) (-2.168)
βMOM -0.172*** -0.163** -0.139***
(-3.221) (-2.410) (-3.311)
Observations 120 120 84
Adj. R-squared 0.100 0.112 0.081
We then control for several individual firm characteristics that might drive returns but are
not captured by the four-factor models. Following Edmans (2011), we perform characteristics
regressions: raw, industry-adjusted, and characteristics-adjusted monthly returns on different firm
characteristics by using two different methods. First, we conduct Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regressions. Second, we use a panel regression approach and cluster standard errors along firm
and time dimensions. Table 6 presents the results. For all three methodologies, firms undergoing
a lame duck CEO period are associated with an additional return of 70 to 120 basis points. These
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results suggest that the relative outperformance of firms during lame duck CEO periods does not
stem from any variation in the controlled individual firm’s characteristics.
Table 6. Robustness: characteristics regressions
This table presents the results of characteristics regressions to calculate firms’ abnormal returns during lame duck CEO period.
From columns (1) to (3), we present Fama-Macbeth monthly regressions for individual stock returns on the dummy variable
Protracted and on controls. From columns (4) to (6), we present panel regressions with two-way clustered standard errors along
firm and month dimensions. We exclude all financial firms and utility firms. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Fama-Macbeth regression Panel regression
Raw Industry Charact. Raw Industry Charact.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protracted 0.008*** 0.008** 0.012** 0.008** 0.007** 0.011**
(2.621) (2.218) (2.610) (2.319) (1.995) (2.332)
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(-0.266) (-0.353) (-0.035) (-0.645) (-0.806) (0.306)
Market-to-book 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.006**
(0.150) (1.121) (0.340) (-0.855) (-0.142) (2.200)
Yield -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.373) (0.046) (-0.008) (0.061) (0.412) (0.076)
Ret2-3 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.001
(0.508) (0.625) (0.329) (-0.054) (0.366) (-0.164)
Ret4-6 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007
(-0.169) (-0.142) (-0.333) (-0.833) (-0.813) (-0.893)
Ret7-12 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000
(0.205) (-0.213) (-0.852) (-0.160) (-0.624) (-0.121)
L2.Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.750) (0.478) (0.464) (0.416) (0.568) (0.088)
L2.Price 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000
(0.661) (0.703) (0.502) (1.673) (1.948) (1.331)
Two-way cluster No No No Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effect No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 420,560 416,279 271,780 420,560 416,279 271,780
Adj. R-squared 0.023 0.020 0.029 0.126 0.018 0.107
Number of groups 120 120 90
Second, we show that the positive alpha is not associated with a change in risk during firms’ lame
duck CEO periods. Our main analysis already controls for systematic risk using the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model. However, there may be some temporary changes in risk during the reign of lame
duck CEOs that may not be well captured by these factors. If the market prices such temporary
changes in risk, the protracted succession portfolio’s abnormal returns may be compensated for the
additional risk. As is standard in the literature, our measure of risk is equity return volatility (e.g.
Ang et al. (2006, 2009)). Hence, we explicitly study changes in volatility around the onset of a
lame duck CEO.
Table 7 shows that there are no economically (nor statistically) meaningful changes in volatility
around protracted CEO successions. In Panel A, we focus on changes in the realized stock return
volatility, while in Panel B, we focus on changes in idiosyncratic volatility. In columns (1) and (2),
we show changes in volatility for the 90 days after the CEO departure announcement compared
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to the 90 days before. We repeat the analysis with changes around 120 and 255 days in columns
(3) and (4), and columns (5) and (6), respectively. In the even-numbered columns, we control for
firm-specific characteristics measured one year prior to news of the incumbent CEO’s departure.
Our results are robust to all specifications.
Table 7. Robustness: Volatility change
This table presents the results for changes in volatility around the announcement of the incumbent CEO’s resignation. The
dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are the average stock return volatility for the 90 days after the announcement less
the average stock return volatility for the 90 days before the announcement. The dependent variables in columns (3) and (4)
are the average stock return volatility 120 days after the announcement less the average stock return volatility 120 days before
the announcement. The dependent variables in column (5) to (6) are the average stock return volatility 225 days after the
announcement less the average stock return volatility 225 days before the announcement. Protracted is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if the succession is protracted, and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in appendix A. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Realized return volatility
∆ Vol 90 days ∆ Vol 120 days ∆ Vol 225 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protracted -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.017* -0.015
(-0.373) (-0.307) (-0.933) (-0.825) (-1.678) (-1.360)
Ln asset -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.812) (-1.074) (-1.022)
Ind-adj ROA 0.053** 0.027 -0.011
(2.251) (0.999) (-0.315)
Leverage 0.015 0.018 0.027
(0.967) (1.112) (1.298)
Market-to-book -0.003* -0.005** -0.005**
(-1.656) (-2.342) (-1.992)
Dividend payer 0.008 0.011 0.022**
(1.201) (1.353) (2.387)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,391 1,204 1,388 1,201 1,380 1,196
R-squared 0.210 0.215 0.311 0.299 0.477 0.461
Panel B: Idiosyncratic return volatility
∆ Vol 90 days ∆ Vol 120 days ∆ Vol 225 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protracted 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.707) (0.503) (0.444) (0.287) (0.138) (-0.152)
Ln asset -0.004** -0.004 -0.005
(-2.039) (-1.556) (-1.466)
Ind-adj ROA 0.056** 0.049* -0.012
(2.202) (1.817) (-0.351)
Leverage -0.001 0.003 0.024
(-0.044) (0.182) (1.105)
Market-to-book -0.002 -0.003 -0.005**
(-0.904) (-1.498) (-1.987)
Dividend payer 0.007 0.009 0.011
(1.293) (1.401) (1.262)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Event Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,391 1,204 1,388 1,201 1,380 1,196
R-squared 0.055 0.072 0.095 0.107 0.244 0.241
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Overall, we confirm our main results showing that firms with protracted CEO successions obtain
a positive Carhart (1997) four-factor α, and show that this result is not driven by any alternative
observed firm characteristics or variations in risk.
4 Why Do Lame Duck CEOs Outperform?
Section 3 showed that firms undergoing a lame duck CEO period experience significant positives
and that this finding is robust to controls for risk and industry and firm characteristics. However,
our results raise the question of why such positive returns take place to begin with. In this section,
we explore two possible explanations for the unexpected performance of lame duck CEOs: under-
reaction to no news of a new CEO and within-firm tournament competition for the new CEO
spot.
4.1 Under-reaction to no news
As King James I of England said “No news is better than evil news.” The passage of time
contains information that relates to the development of the current state.
Because of limited attention or behavioral biases, investors’ reactions are different for different
types of news. In particular, investors have been shown to under-react to less obvious news (Peng
and Xiong, 2006). It is thus reasonable to expect investors to be oblivious to information contained
in the mere passage of time. For example, Giglio and Shue (2014) find that during the period
between an M&A announcement and its completion, the passage of time contains information on
the probability of M&A completion. They document how investors under-react to the information
embedded within the mere passage of time, detecting a positive correlation between stock returns
and the probability of deal completion, as measured by the hazard rate.
Similar to Giglio and Shue (2014), we also find that investors under-react to “no news” during
the “lame duck” period. Following initial announcements that the incumbent CEO will be stepping
down, firms enter into the lame duck period with no explicit announcement of the new CEO’s
identity. We document investors’ under-reaction to the (expected) probability of the new CEO’s
identity being announced.
Following the methodology of Giglio and Shue (2014), Figure 3 Panel A shows that the hazard
rate on the probability of announcing the new CEO identity next week conditional on not having
declared it yet is hump-shaped.6 The hazard rate increases from 0.07 during event week 1 to almost
6The detail of calculation is in appendix B.
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0.2 during event week 29, and then declines afterwards. The different hazard rates throughout the
event window indicate that the passage of time indeed contains information relevant to the CEO
succession. Figure 3 Panel B shows that firms’ stock returns through event weeks also follow a
hump-shaped pattern, peaking around the same event time as the hazard rate. From Figure 3,
the strong co-movement of hazard rate and stock return indicates a possible channel for investors’
under-reaction to a lack of news during the lame duck period.
To formally test the predicted correlation between hazard rate and stock return, we conduct
regression analysis in table 8. In Table 8 Panel A, we estimate a regression of weekly returns by
event week hazard rate. We add a calendar time fixed effect to control for time-varying unobserved
factors. In column (1), we observe a positive and significant correlation between the hazard rate and
the weekly return. The result confirms our observation from Figure 3. From column (2) to column
(5), we test the relationship between hazard rate and weekly returns across subsamples. In columns
(2) and (3), we show that our results are economically more significant for firms that ultimately
appoint an internal candidate, but the statistical differences are small. In columns (4) and (5), we
show that the positive relationship between stock returns and the hazard rate is concentrated in the
subsample in which tournament competition among senior executives is higher than the industry
median level. We expand on tournament incentives in the next section.
In Panel B, we construct a calendar-time portfolio and sort firms into two portfolios. One
includes firms with higher hazard rates than the median at a given trading time; the other contains
firms with lower hazard rates than the median at the same point. If under-reaction to no news
generates the excess abnormal return, we should also expect to observe the portfolio containing
firms with higher hazard rates to be associated with higher alphas than the portfolio with lower
hazard rate firms. Across three different benchmarks, the portfolio with higher hazard rate firms,
on average, experiences a 1.4% excess monthly return, which is, on average, twice the size of the
portfolio containing firms with low hazard rates.
Overall, our evidence documents that investors’ under-reaction to no news explains the positive
excess returns for firms undergoing a lame duck period.
4.2 Internal Tournament
Firms benefit from tournament competition by motivating internal candidates to compete and
then promoting the best candidate to the position of CEO (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 7 Although
7Tournament theory also predicts a sabotaging situation between agents, as the most crucial factor is the relative
performance between candidates. We argue that candidates’ sabotage is of less concern between internal candidates.
21
Figure 3. Weekly hazard rate and stock return
The top panel shows the estimated weekly hazard rates for all protracted CEO successions over the event time, from the end
of the week the firm announces the incumbent CEO’s resignation (e0) through the end of the week that the firm reveals the
identity of the successor CEO (e1). The bottom panel plots the average weekly return and 95% confidence interval, from the
end of the week that the firm announces the incumbent CEO’s resignation (e0) through the end of the week that the firm
reveals the identity of the successor CEO (e1).
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Table 8. Mechanism: Hazard rate
This table Panel A shows the regression of riwt = b0 + b1hw + γt + εiwt, where i indexes CEO turnovers; t is the calendar
time (year-month); γt represents a set of calendar time year-month fixed effects. hw is the event week w’s hazard rate. Column
(1) shows results for the regression analysis performed on the full sample. Column (2) focuses on firms that appoint internal
successors. Column (3) focuses on firms that appoint external successors. Column (4) focuses on firms with high tournament
competition levels. Column (5) focuses on firms with low tournament competition levels. Standard errors are clustered at both
the calendar year-month level and at the turnover level. Panel B shows results for the monthly regressions of returns to an
equally-weighted portfolio on the Carhart (1997) four factors, MKT, SMB, HML, and MOM. The dependent variable is the
return for the long-only portfolio of protracted firms less either the risk-free rate, the industry-matched portfolio return, or the
characteristics-matched portfolio return. Similar to Giglio and Shue (2014), we sort firms into two portfolios: one containing
firms with a hazard rate higher than the median and the other containing firms with a hazard rate lower than the median. We
exclude all financial and utility firms. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Weekly return regression
Full New CEO Tournament
Internal External High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hazard rate 0.013*** 0.018** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.006
(3.886) (2.331) (3.080) (3.741) (1.054)
Calendar Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,995 3,531 6,444 5,729 4,144
R-squared 0.058 0.068 0.070 0.057 0.088
Panel B: Hazard excess returns over
Risk-free Industry Charact.
(1) (2) (3)
αHigh 0.014** 0.013** 0.013*
(2.354) (2.179) (1.764)
αLow 0.005 0.003 0.010*
(0.967) (0.586) (1.797)
Spread 0.009 0.009 0.004
(1.320) (1.331) (0.328)
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the tournament competition will benefit firms, it is also an intangible asset that will not immediately
be incorporated into firm value. First, firms are not required to disclose their succession planning
in detail. Therefore, it is difficult for external agents to learn ex-ante whether firms will introduce
an external talent or promote an internal candidate. Second, until the final announcement, it is
not obvious to candidates who is the winner. Therefore, consistent with Edmans (2011); Mueller
et al. (2017), the market does not fully capture this intangible information.
When a CEO announces his resignation, other high-ranking executives engage in a competition
to claim the (soon to be vacant) position. As predicted by tournament theory (Rosen, 1981; Main
et al., 1993), the competition intensity depends on differences in the ex-ante probability of winning
the competition among tournament participants: the more equally likely all participants are to
win, the higher the aggregated effort. Therefore, we expect the tournament-based consequences of
protracted successions to be negatively related to the ex-ante dispersion of candidates’ probability
of winning. We use the inverse of the standard deviation of compensation among tournament
participants in the year prior to the tournament as a proxy for similarity in the ex-ante probability
of winning the tournament. We compare this measure with the industry median. We then split our
sample between protracted succession with high (above industry median) and low (below industry
median) tournament competition levels, respectively.
Table 9 Panel A examines the calendar-time portfolio alphas for firms with high tournament
competition and firms with low tournament competition. The high tournament competition portfo-
lio generates significant returns over all benchmarks. The alpha is 1.5% monthly above the risk-free
rate, 1.3% monthly controlling for an industry portfolio, and 1.8% monthly controlling for a similar
characteristics-matched portfolio. The excess returns are much higher than the low tournament
portfolio, and spreads of the excess returns between two portfolios are also substantial.
Moreover, we expect tournament competition to be higher when firms ultimately appoint inter-
nal candidates. Although it is impossible for candidates to have this information until the successor
CEO’s identity is revealed, it is reasonable to assume that candidates can forecast whether the firm
will appoint an internal or an external candidate in the end. Therefore, Panel B of Table 9 uses
whether the successor CEO was hired externally or internally as a proxy for the tournament. If the
new CEO is an internal hire, then the firm is more likely to perform an internal candidate tourna-
ment than in cases when the new CEO is an external hire. The portfolio with successor CEOs hired
First, the board of directors will monitor the competition and try to ensure that it does not destroy shareholder value.
Second, internal candidates are disciplined by the possibility of external candidates and future career prospects from
the external labor market.
24
Table 9. Mechanism: Tournament
This table presents monthly regressions of returns to an equally-weighted portfolio on the Carhart (1997) four factors, MKT,
SMB, HML, and MOM. The dependent variable is the return for the long-only portfolio containing protracted firms, less either
the risk-free rate, the industry-matched portfolio return, or the characteristics-matched portfolio return. We exclude all financial
and utility firms. In Panel A, we sort firms into two portfolios, one containing firms with ex-ante tournament competition levels
higher than the industry median and the other containing firms with ex-ante tournament competition levels lower than the
industry median. In Panel B we sort firms into two portfolios: one containing firms that hire successor CEOs internally and
the other containing firms that hire successor CEOs externally. In Panel C, we only focus on firms that hire successor CEOs
internally and sort these into two portfolios: one containing firms with tournament competition levels higher than the industry
median and the other containing firms with tournament competition levels lower than the industry median. The αs are excess
risk-adjusted returns. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are in parentheses. ***, **, and *





αhigh 0.015*** 0.013** 0.018***
(2.618) (2.157) (2.685)
αlow 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(0.599) (-0.061) (0.425)
Spread 0.013* 0.013** 0.016
(1.955) (1.973) (1.386)
Panel B: New CEO type
αinternal 0.022** 0.023** 0.028**
(2.308) (2.554) (2.140)
αexternal 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(0.682) (-0.107) (0.458)
Spread 0.019** 0.023** 0.026*
(2.083) (2.437) (1.727)
Panel C: Internal new CEO and tournament
αinternal&high 0.037* 0.037* 0.051*
(1.893) (1.904) (1.894)
αexternal&low -0.004 -0.007** -0.003
(-0.926) (-2.076) (-0.560)
Spread 0.039** 0.043** 0.054**
(2.054) (2.302) (1.999)
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internally generates an excess return of more than 2% monthly over different benchmarks and more
than twice the value of the excess return from the main result. The monthly excess returns for the
portfolio of firms hiring external candidates are insignificant from 0. Panel C presents the portfolio
alpha for firms that have high tournament competition and hire their successor CEO internally.
The results are 4% monthly excess returns.
Table 10 presents additional evidence of the tournament competition mechanism. From Table 4
we know that firms in the lame duck CEO period are associated with a higher abnormal stock return
around earnings announcements. If the tournament competition mechanism is valid, we should also
expect to observe the abnormal stock return around earnings announcements to be higher for firms
with ex-ante intense tournament competition levels or with successor CEOs hired internally. Our
results in column (1) and column (3) confirm our hypothesis. Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we
show that the economic significance of our results increases when we focus on high tournament
incentives that end up appointing an internal candidates; consistent with our hypothesis.
Table 10. Mechanism: Tournament and earnings announcement
This table shows the results of robustness tests on abnormal returns around earnings announcements from 2005 to 2015.
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return within the three-day window around the earnings announcements.
Abnormal returns are calculated above a market model with a -255 to -46 day estimation window. Protracted is a dummy
variable that has a value of 1 if the firm is undergoing a lame duck CEO period (e1) and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) split
the total sample according to the degree of tournament competition for firms’ senior executives below the CEO level. Columns
(3) and (4) split the total sample according to whether the new CEO is hired internally or externally. Columns (5) and (6) focus
on internal successions and are split based on the level of tournament competition. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
CAR[-1,+1]
Tournament New CEO type New CEO type
&Tournament
High Low Internal External Internal&High External&Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protracted 0.015* 0.005 0.021** 0.009 0.039** 0.004
(1.895) (1.014) (2.388) (1.457) (2.066) (0.458)
Ln asset -0.006*** -0.006** -0.008*** -0.005 -0.007** 0.005
(-2.887) (-2.265) (-3.853) (-1.037) (-2.206) (0.561)
Market-to-book 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.010***
(4.475) (2.942) (2.657) (3.257) (2.384) (2.825)
Leverage -0.009 -0.011 -0.022*** -0.003 -0.022* 0.018
(-1.344) (-1.382) (-2.903) (-0.332) (-1.807) (0.740)
Ind-adj ROA 0.030*** -0.004 0.015*** 0.047*** 0.021 -0.055
(3.151) (-0.334) (16.604) (2.608) (1.061) (-1.254)
Dividend Payer -0.010*** -0.007* -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.029**
(-3.410) (-1.724) (-3.188) (-2.615) (-2.669) (-2.498)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,432 24,752 28,031 8,128 15,295 2,814
R-squared 0.064 0.073 0.042 0.052 0.056 0.101
It is also worth testing whether these two mechanisms are associated with systemic risk change
across different portfolio within the group. Table 11 A shows that betas for the Fama-French three
26
factors are not statistically different between portfolios in the same group (with the exception of
the beta associated with momentum factor in the hazard rate portfolio).
Table 11. Mechanism: Betas across strategies
This table reports the betas for the Carhart (1997) four-factors for the different portfolio construction strategies, along with a
test of the null hypothesis that betas do not vary across the same strategy group, separately for each of the four factors. Panel
A tests betas’ differences across hazard rate portfolios. Panel B tests the betas’ differences across new CEO identity portfolios.
Panel C tests the betas’ differences across tournament competition portfolios. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Strategy betas
mktrf smb hml umd
(1) (2) (2) (3)
Panel A: Hazard rate
Low hazard 1.141*** 0.837*** 0.023 -0.264***
(8.310) (7.238) (0.157) (-4.403)
High hazard 1.169*** 0.604** -0.165 -0.718***
(13.378) (1.983) (-0.745) (-3.768)
Test high hazard = low hazard: p-value 0.8922 0.5038 0.5841 0.0313**
Panel B: New CEO identity
Internal 1.120*** 0.903*** 0.051 -0.386***
(19.378) (3.250) (0.290) (-3.700)
External 1.182*** 0.640*** -0.116 -0.518***
(10.003) (7.396) (-0.789) (-5.936)
Test Internal = External: p-value 0.3118 0.7200 0.6437 0.3333
Panel C: Tournament competition
High tournament 1.107*** 0.837*** -0.105 -0.583***
(10.688) (3.210) (-0.400) (-2.740)
Low tournament 1.225*** 0.601*** -0.145 -0.445***
(8.010) (3.046) (-0.789) (-11.19)
Test high tournament = low tournament: p-value 0.3118 0.7200 0.6437 0.3333
Overall, our results confirm our hypothesis that internal tournament competition is one mech-




The previous two subsections explored possible mechanisms to explain the positive excess return
for firms undergoing a lame duck CEO period. There are still other potential explanations for this
phenomenon.
Huson et al. (2004); Taylor (2010) suggest that firms’ performances reverse after they fire their
incumbent CEOs. In particular, Taylor (2010) predicts a gradual increase in firms’ profitability
instead of a sharp increase. Therefore, our positive abnormal return may be explained by firms’
firing decisions for incompetent outgoing CEOs. If that were the case, then we should observe
firms with forced CEO turnover to perform better than firms with voluntary CEO turnover. As in
Parrino (1997), we sort firms into two portfolios based on whether the incumbent CEO was fired or
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not. Table 12 Panel A shows the results. Under different benchmark portfolios, the excess returns
for the portfolio with forced (or “fired”) CEO turnover does not differ from the excess returns of the
portfolio with voluntary CEO turnover. It is thus reasonable to conclude that firms’ decisions to
forcibly remove incumbent CEOs is not the driving factor leading to excess returns enjoyed during
the lame duck CEO period.
Table 12. Mechanism: Discussion
This table reports monthly regressions of returns to an equally weighted portfolio on the Carhart (1997) four factors, MKT,
SMB, HML, and MOM. The dependent variable is the return for the long-only portfolio of protracted firms less either the
risk-free rate, the industry-matched portfolio return, or the characteristics-matched portfolio return. We exclude all financial
and utility firms. In Panel A, we sort firms into two portfolios based on whether the incumbent CEO was forced to leave or left
voluntarily, based on the algorithm proposed byParrino (1997). In Panel B, we sort firms into two portfolios based on whether
the firm appoints an interim CEO to supervise daily operations following the incumbent’s departure. In Panel C, we only focus
on firms that appoint interim CEOs and sort firms into two portfolios based on whether the interim CEO was promoted to the
permanent position or not. In Panel D, we sort firms into two portfolios based on the size of the board. In Panel E, we sort
firms into two portfolios based on whether the board size is too extreme(small and large), or in the medium level. In Panel F, we
sort firms into two portfolios based on the ratio of independent directors sitting on the board. The αs are excess risk-adjusted
returns. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote




Panel A: Turnover reason
αvoluntary 0.010* 0.008 0.014*
(1.647) (1.365) (1.820)
αforced 0.010* 0.008* 0.011*
(1.701) (1.667) (1.955)
Panel B: Interim CEO
αhave 0.007*** 0.005* 0.005
(2.758) (1.737) (1.446)
αno 0.015 0.014 0.024**
(1.537) (1.620) (2.033)
Panel C: Interim CEO only
αPromoted -0.003 -0.004 -0.013
(-0.458) (-0.585) (-1.467)
αNotPromoted 0.007* 0.004 0.007
(1.794) (1.201) (1.299)
Panel D: Board size
αlarge 0.001 0.002 -0.007
(0.107) (0.382) (-0.896)
αsmall 0.001 0.000 0.004
(0.290) (0.032) (0.446)
Panel E: Board size II
αextreme 0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.210) (0.091) (-0.196)
αmediam -0.000 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.070) (-0.391) (-0.485)
Panel F: Board independence
αhigh 0.006 0.006 0.003
(1.098) (1.152) (0.518)
αlow -0.004 -0.006** -0.003
(-1.401) (-2.056) (-0.768)
Another possible explanation is that during the lame duck CEO period, firms’ operations im-
prove. For instance, firms may be using the position of interim CEO to test the most favorable
candidates. When interim CEOs perform well, they will be promoted to permanent positions. In
our lame duck CEO sample, more than 50% of firms appointed an interim CEO. In Table 12 Panel
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B, we show that the magnitude of alpha for firms that appoint interim CEOs is smaller than the
alpha for firms that do not appoint interim CEOs. In Panel C, we focus on the subsample of firms
that appointed interim CEOs, and sort this into two portfolios based on whether the interim CEO
was promoted permanently to the CEO position or not. If the exceptional interim CEOs achieved
extremely positive outcomes, then we should observe them being promoted to the permanent po-
sition. However, our results indicate the opposite. It is therefore unlikely that the appointment of
an interim CEO drives the results.
Similarly, during the lame duck CEO period, the board takes responsibility to protect share-
holders. Another alternative explanation is that excess returns during the lame duck period derives
from boards that operate extremely effectively: well-functioning board governance generates the
positive alpha. This hypothesis is consistent with Gompers et al. (2003); Giroud and Mueller
(2011), who show that strong governance is associated with excess returns. We use three different
measures for board quality. In Table 12 Panel D, we sort portfolios based on board size. If board
quality leads to excess returns, then we should observe that the portfolio containing smaller boards
performs better than the portfolio containing larger board, as smaller boards have been shown to
be more effective (Yermack, 1996). However, in Panel D, the portfolio containing firms with large
boards has an alpha similar to the portfolio with firms with small boards. Coles et al. (2008) has
also suggested that board size and firm performance is U shaped. As such, we repeat our analysis
for median versus extreme board size values. Panel E shows that our results are indeed not driven
by board size. The third measure we use to proxy board quality is an independence ratio, as a
higher independence ratio may lead to better monitoring (Guo and Masulis, 2015). If this were the
case, then the portfolio containing firms with higher board independence ratios will be the main
driver of excess returns in the main result. Table 12 Panel F shows that although the alpha for the
portfolio containing firms with high independence ratios is positive, it is not statistically significant
or robust to reject the null hypothesis.
Overall, it is unlikely that these three alternative explanations lead to an excess return in the
main portfolio containing firms undergoing a lame duck CEO period.
5.2 Long-run performance
We now focus on the long-run performance of firm-CEO matches resulting from a protracted
CEO succession. To do so, we calculate the long-run abnormal performance of firms that underwent
a protracted CEO succession and compare that to firms that experienced a prompt CEO succession.
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We show our results in Figure 4: Firms with either type of succession on average obtain positive
long-run abnormal performance. Over three years after CEO succession, firms with joint CEO
succession on average experience 10% abnormal returns, and firms with protracted CEO succession
on average earn much higher abnormal returns (more than 50%).
Figure 4. Long-run stock performance
This figure shows the abnormal returns from the end of the week that the firm announces the incumbent CEO’s resignation for
firms under different types of succession. The abnormal return is calculated over the three-year event window [+6, +700], and
based on Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The red line represents the cumulative abnormal return associated with protracted
succession, while the blue line represents the cumulative abnormal return associated with joint succession. The dashed lines
represent the 95% confidence intervals.
We consider this result important for the policy implications of our findings. Protracted CEO
successions not only generate a positive alpha during the reign of the “lame duck” CEO, but also
lead to a better CEO-firm match that ultimately results in improved performance in the long-run.
In other words, when firms take their time to choose their new CEOs, they seem to do a better job
at picking the right one.
6 Conclusion
We document that protracted CEO successions are frequent, with 31% of CEO successions for
S&P 1500 firms between 2005 and 2014 being protracted and an average lame duck CEO reign of 173
days. Contrary to conventional views, firms with protracted CEO successions experience an annual
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four-factor alpha of 11% during the lame duck CEOs’ reign after controlling for industry-level
factors and other observed firm characteristics. We document no significant changes in realized
or idiosyncratic return volatility. These findings imply that the market slowly incorporates the
information contained in the lame duck CEO event.
The results are consistent with two possible explanations: First, the market under-reaction to
the information contained in the passage of time from news of the incumbent CEO’s departure
to the announcement of the new CEO’s identity. We find that the weekly hazard rate for the
probability that a new CEO will be announced varies over time after the incumbent CEO steps
down, and we document that lame duck firms’ abnormal performance correlates with high hazard
rates. Second, we find that the internal tournament competition between CEO candidates generates
the positive excess returns. This intangible information is hard to incorporate into the market value
of firms. We show that abnormal returns are larger for firms with higher tournament competition
levels and for firms that ultimately appoint an internal candidate as the successor CEO.
Overall, our results suggest that there is an unwarranted negative connotation associated with
lame duck CEOs. Firms over-perform during their reign and long successions lead to healthy
competition among candidates, improving overall firm performance.
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A Appendix: Variable definition
Variable definitions are below. Compustat variable names are denoted by their Xpressfeed
pneumonic and CRSP variable names and IBES names are in bold.
Protracted = 1 if the first news article about the incumbent CEO’s resignation takes place before
the first news article revealing the new CEO’s identity; 0 otherwise. News search conducted using
FACTIVA.
mktrf = From WRDS Fama-French & Liquidity Factors
smb = From WRDS Fama-French & Liquidity Factors.
hml = From WRDS Fama-French & Liquidity Factors.
mom = From WRDS Fama-French & Liquidity Factors.
Ln asset = ln(at).
Leverage = dltt+dlcat .
ROA = ebitdaat .
Ind-adj ROA = ROA - median Fama-French 48 industry ROA.
Market-to-book = prcc_f∗cshpri+dltt+dlc+pstkl−txditcat .
Dividend Payer = 1 if dvc > 0; 0 otherwise.
CEO focus = # of news article mentioning incumbent CEO# of news article cover firm .
Tournament incentive = 1Standard deviation of highest paid four vice-president base salary .
Size = log of the firm’s market capitalization (in billions).
Yield = firm’s dividend yield (dvt).
Ret2-3 = compounded returns in months t-3 to month t-2.
Ret4-6 = compounded returns in months t-6 to month t-4.
Ret7-12 = compounded returns in months t-12 to month t-7.
Volume = trading volume (in millions) (vol).
Price = stock price at end of month(prc).
Mean forecast error = mean of the most resent forecast−actualactual .
Median forecast error = median of the most resent forecast−actualactual .
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B Appendix: Hazard rate
The hazard rate used in this paper is calculated by applying the NelsonAalen nonparametric
estimator. The hazard rate measures the probability of finishing the CEO search and announcing
the successor at time t, conditional on the firm still having released no explicit information on the
new CEO’s identity at time t−1. We assume the hazard rate draws from the same distribution and
for each event time (week), we calculate the hazard rate based on the whole lame duck CEO sample
data. In Figure 3 Panel A, we show the shape of the hazard rate within one year of the incumbent
CEO’s departure announcement. In a longer horizon, the shape of the hazard rate remains similar,
except the right tail becomes closer to 0. Similar measures have been used in Giglio and Shue (2014)
to estimate the merger completion hazard rate from the time that news of a merger is announced




Selection versus Incentives in Incentive Pay
1 Introduction
What drives the positive correlation between CEO incentive pay and firm performance? John
Thompson, the chairman of Microsoft, believes that incentive pay “attract[s] and motivate[s] a
world-class CEO.” Similarly, according to Apple Inc.’s 2016 proxy statement, its restricted stock
grants, by far the largest component of incentive pay, are “the most effective way to attract and
retain a talented executive team and to align executive interests with those of shareholders.”8 These
examples highlight the dual role of incentive pay as both a selection and an incentive mechanism
for maximizing performance as discussed in Lazear (2000).
The academic literature has long debated the relative importance of these two mechanisms. One
strand of literature argues that differential manifestations of the agency problem between firms are
the primary driver of cross-sectional differences in incentive pay (Gayle and Miller, 2009; Gayle
et al., 2015). That is, the incentive effect is the dominant force. Another strand of literature argues
that talent matching between CEOs and firms determines the variation in CEO pay (Gabaix and
Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008). That is, the selection effect is the dominant force. Despite these
conflicting views, because of the endogenous nature of the problem, disentangling these two effects
and assessing their relative importance remains an open issue.
The main contribution of this paper is its implementation of a matching model to shed light
on both the incentive and selection effects of incentive pay on firm performance by empirically
quantifying the relative importance of these effects. I first document that there exists a robust
positive correlation between new CEOs’ incentive pay and firm performance. After controlling for
the selection effect, the incentive effect indicates that a 1% increase in pay for performance leads to
a 1.51% increase in firm performance, while the selection effect suggests that a 1% increase in pay
for performance leads to a 0.21% increase in firm performance. Hence, the incentive effect accounts
for 87.3% of the total effect of incentive pay on firm performance and the selection effect accounts
for 12.7% of the total effect.
The incentive effect is motivated by the existence of agency problems between managers and
8Many other firms also attest to the dual effects of incentive pay. For example, a similar statement is found in
PayPal Holdings Inc.’s 2016 proxy statement, incentive pay “attracts highly capable leaders in an extremely competitive
talent market” and “compensates for the creation of longer-term value over time.”
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shareholders. Managers may seek to enjoy a quiet life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), or
opt to pursue their own agenda by exploiting perks and individual prestige instead of maximizing
shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Hence, incentive pay is
used to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests to generate better performance. The selection
effect arises from the competitive equilibrium view that market forces can allocate human capital
efficiently (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1981; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008). Therefore, incentive
pay is part of the CEO-firm matching mechanism: better CEOs agree to work for firms with high
incentive pay and their talents subsequently lead to better expected firm performance in the future.
Therefore, even if CEOs’ efforts have no effect on firm performance, high incentive pay still creates
a positive assortative matching mechanism between firms and CEOs, generates higher matching
value, and leads to better performance in the future.
Distinguishing between these two effect channels of incentive pay on performance raises several
challenges. Incentive pay becomes an endogenous variable when more-talented managers work
for firms offering higher incentive pay and talent cannot be correctly measured. Then, talent
mismeasurement will result in unobserved talent factors correlating with the matching value and
also firms’ performance. Therefore, the directly estimated coefficients are biased. Unfortunately,
the matching between CEOs and firms is a complex endogenous process involving a large number of
observed and unobserved characteristics of both parties and other entities. This complexity makes
finding valid instruments unlikely.
Instead, I use a structural model to overcome the endogeneity problem. The structural model
combines two key ingredients: an assortative one-to-one matching model that controls for the
selection effect explicitly in the CEO-firm matching equilibrium and an outcome equation that
specifies the performance of the observed matches. The one-to-one matching model implies that
one firm can only match with one CEO and one CEO can only work for one firm at a time,
thus the other agents participating in the same CEO labor market have an effect on the matching
decision. In market contexts, agents’ own characteristics determine the matching value, but it is
the relative ranking that matters for matching decisions. Therefore, matching decisions not only
depend on the characteristics of the two agents but also on other agents’ characteristics in the
market. As these other agents’ characteristics are not likely to influence subsequent matched pair
performance, the outcome equation only depends on the matched agents’ characteristics. Exogenous
variation in other agents’ characteristics identifies the incentive and selection effect of incentive pay
on performance.
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The main assumption for identification is that agents are exogenously assigned across markets.
That is, CEOs and firms cannot self-select to specific markets due to unobservable reasons. Specif-
ically, I assume the CEO market is segregated by the calendar year; thus in each calendar year new
CEO candidates and firms with job vacancies participate in the CEO labor market for exogenous
reasons. Similar identification assumptions have been used in Sorensen (2007a); Park (2013); Chen
(2014); Ni and Srinivasan (2015); Pan (2015); Akkus et al. (2016b).
This paper relates to four literature domains. The first domain focuses on the influence of the
dual effect of incentive pay for executives and workers (Lazear, 2000; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005; Arya
and Mittendorf, 2005). In this respect, I provide the first quantitative estimates of the incentive
and selection effects of CEO incentive pay on firm performance.
Second, a growing body of literature uses matching models to correct for nonrandom sampling
biases in different contexts such as venture capital markets (Sorensen, 2007a; Akkus et al., 2016a),
M&A markets (Park, 2013; Akkus et al., 2016b), director labor markets (Matveyev, 2016), and
executive labor markets (Pan, 2015), among others.
In methodological terms, this paper is also related to those finance studies that apply Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. MCMC methods are particularly useful in estimating
models with many latent variables and hierarchical structures.9
This paper is also related to the extant literature investigating the effects of incentive pay
on firm performance. Mehran (1995) shows incentive pay and firm performance are positively
associated. Bandiera et al. (2009) carry out a field experiment and find that switching from fixed
pay to incentive pay for managers increases firms’ overall performance. Agarwal et al. (2009) show
that hedge funds with higher incentive pay for fund managers are associated with superior fund
performance. Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) find that firms with higher CEO equity incentives
outperform companies with lower CEO equity incentives by 4 to 10% annually.
This paper also sheds light on the regulation of CEO incentive pay. Regulating CEO incen-
tive pay not only has an effect on CEOs’ motivation to perform well but also on the inefficient
allocation of talent. In the absence of job mobility, local regulations on CEOs’ incentive pay will
have little effect on firms’ performance. However, in a fully integrated market for CEOs, tough
local regulations on CEOs’ incentive pay will induce talented candidates to move. This distorts
9Other researchers have applied MCMC including: Li (1999) in the context of estimating the duration of Chapter 11
bankruptcy; Sorensen (2007a) to estimate matching between VCs and firms; Park (2013) to understand the incentive
for mergers between mutual funds; Korteweg and Sorensen (2010, 2015) to accommodate dynamic selection; and
finally Chen (2014) to explore loan markets. Korteweg (2013) provides an excellent review of MCMC methods and
applications
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talent allocation, thus creating inefficiencies. When restricting CEO incentive pay, it is crucial
that regulators consider the effect of talent mismatch on labor market dynamics and outcomes.
10 Therefore, a better understanding of these two effects could lead to smarter ways of regulating
incentive pay.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric frame-
work. Section 4 outlines the data and discusses the estimation results. Section 4 explores the
robustness of our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Econometric Framework
2.1 Identification strategy
In this section, I present a simple example to illustrate the identification method (see Table 1).
Specifically, three CEO candidates (1, 2, and 3) and three different firms (A, B, and C) are in
a market seeking for a match. Xi represents a vector containing each agent’s characteristics.
Panel A shows the matching of CEOs and firms in the market. The matches in the diagonal are
observed matches, while the off-diagonal matches are counterfactual matches. The numbers in Panel
A represent matching values of observed matches; these matching values are determined by the
matched pairs’ characteristics. To guarantee the observed matches are stable, the matching values
of counterfactual matches need to satisfy the condition that no matched pair would want to deviate
from the current match. Panel B illustrates possible matching value ranges for counterfactual
matches to guarantee a stable match. Panel C shows the performance of matched CEO-firm
pairs. For illustrative purposes, I explore one of the observed matches, CEO 2 and firm B, for
an illustration. The matching value of CEO 2 and firm B is 20 in Panels B and C. This value is
determined by the characteristics of CEO 2 and firm B and can be denoted as V2B ≡ f(X2, XB).
For CEO 2 and firm B to be an observed match, this needs to satisfy the condition that neither CEO
2 nor firm B would like to deviate from the current match and to form a new match with the other
agents that would also like to match with them. From the matching value range of counterfactual
matches in Panel B, CEO 2 does not want to deviate to firm A because of V2A < V2B. CEO 2
might want to deviate and form a match with firm C if V2C > V2B, but firm C does not want
10Recently, in the Netherlands, the Dutch parliament considered abolition of the 20 percent bonus cap in the
financial industry. The proponents of this change contend that the Netherlands risks being uncompetitive relative
to other European countries vis-á-vis attracting financial institutions that are considering moving from the UK to
continental Europe before the conclusion of Brexit negotiations in March 2018. Importantly, other European Union
countries limit financial industry bonuses to 100 percent of fixed pay.
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to deviate because V2C < V3C . Firm B does not want to deviate to CEO 1 because V2B > V1B.
Firm B might want to match with CEO 3 if V3B > V2B, but CEO 3 does not want to match
with firm B because V3C > V3B. Because of these foregoing inequalities, the matching decision of
CEO 2 and firm B not only depends on their characteristics but also on the characteristics of the
other agents in the market. Thus, the matching decision of CEO 2 and firm B can be denoted as
M2B ≡ 1g(X1,X2,X3,XA,XB ,XC)>0. However, the performance of the matched pair CEO 2 and firm
B, Y2B in Panel C, is unlikely to be influenced by other agents’ characteristics. Then the outcome
function can be denoted as Y2B ≡ y(X2, XB). The fact that the characteristics of other agents
affect the matching decision but not the performance of the match can serve as the exogenous
variation to control for selection from the incentive effect.
Table 1. Demonstration example
This example is configured in terms of a matching market consisting of three CEOs (1, 2, 3) and three firms (A, B, C) to
visualize the estimation method for separating the selection effect from the incentive effect. Panel A shows the stable matching
values between firms and CEOs for all possible matches. The three matches in the diagonal are observed matches and the
off-diagonal matches are counterfactual matches. The matching values are determined by the characteristics of the agents
forming the matches. Panel C shows the final outcomes of the observed matches. These final outcomes are also dependent on
matching agents’ characteristics.
Panel A: Observed matches
Firms
A B C
1 10 NA NA
CEOs 2 NA 20 NA
3 NA NA 30
Panel B: All matches
Firms
A B C
1 10 (-inf, 20) (-inf, 30)
CEOs 2 (-inf, 20) 20 (-inf, 30)




1 2 NA NA
CEOs 2 NA 5 NA
3 NA NA 8
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2.2 Two-sided matching model
This section presents a matching model to address the matching problem between firms and
CEOs. The matching between CEOs and firms is a bilateral decision process that depends on
agents’ preferences on both sides. This feature is captured by a variation of the two-sided matching
model for marriage market (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1992)11. Specifically, I
present a generalized selection model where the first stage is a one-to-one matching model.
The labor market for CEOs contains two types and a finite number of agents on each side
of the two-sided market. In market t, a set It contains all of the CEO candidates, and a set Jt
contains all of the firms that need to hire a new CEO. Each CEO works for only one firm, and
each firm attracts only one CEO. Then the number of CEO candidates and firms are equal. The
set containing all possible matches between CEO candidates and firms in market t is denoted as
Mt. Therefore Mt = It × Jt. A matching contains observed matches in market t denoted as µt is a
subset of Mt, where µt ⊂ Mt. The matched firm for CEO i in market t is denoted as µt(i) and the
matched CEO for firm j in market t is denoted as µt(j). If ij ∈ µt, then i = µt(j) and j = µt(i).
Agents from each side of the market simultaneously choose their partners from the other side of
the market to maximize the latent matching value. The matching process is frictionless and subject
to complete information. I denote the matching value between CEO i and firm j as Vij regardless
of whether ij is a matched pair or not. The matching values are assumed to be distinct to avoid
the situation that agents can be indifferent between two matches.
To generate a feasible econometric model, the existence and uniqueness of the matching equi-
librium needs to be established. According to Roth and Sotomayor (1992), the equilibrium for
one-to-one matching always exists, but that equilibrium might not be unique. To guarantee the
equilibrium is unique, I follow Niederle and Yariv (2009) and assume firms and CEOs in the mar-
ket have aligned preferences; this condition is more restrictive than some of the identified sufficient
conditions for uniqueness of an equilibrium match discussed in Eeckhout (2000); Clark (2006). In
practice, a simple fixed sharing rule of the matching value between CEOs and firms can easily
satisfy the aligned preferences requirement.12
The equilibrium concept used in the matching market is stability. A matching is stable if there
is no matched pair of agents who would like to deviate from their current match. The unique
11Other applications that use a similar model setting as matching market include Sorensen (2007a); Park (2013);
Chen (2014); Ni and Srinivasan (2015); Akkus et al. (2016b)
12This means a sub-standard CEO cannot match with a well performing firm by accepting a low stake or no stake
in the firm. That is, the matching model framework used in this paper is a non-transferable utility model. See Fox
(2009, 2017); Pan (2015) for estimating matching models with transfers.
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equilibrium is characterized by a set of inequalities based on no blocking pairs for equilibrium
matching.
Suppose CEO i and firm j are matched in market m, and let µ(i) denote the firm that matched
with CEO i. In this case, it is firm j. Let µ(j) denote the CEO that matched with firm j. In this
case, i = µ(j).
For ij to be a stable match, we require that no blocking pairs exist for ij, that is, the opportunity
cost of CEO i remaining matched with firm j or the opportunity cost of firm j remaining matched
with CEO i has to be smaller than Vij , the matching value of ij.
The opportunity cost of CEO i, OCi, is the maximum value that CEO i can get from the set
of feasible deviations of CEO i instead of matching with firm j. The opportunity cost of firm j,
OCj , is the maximum value firm j can get from the set of feasible deviations of firm j instead of
matching with CEO i. Because of the fixed sharing rule, finding the maximum value that agents
can get is equivalent to finding the maximum matching value that agents can make. That is,
Vij > max[OCi, OCj ],
where
OCi = max(Vij′),∀j′ ∈ J ∩ (Vij′ > Vµ(j′)j′),
OCj = max(Vi′j),∀i′ ∈ I ∩ (Vi′j > Vi′µ(i′)).
In another circumstance that executive i and firm j are not matched in market m, then ij
cannot be the blocking pair for their own current matches. Then the matching value of ij has to
be smaller than the matching value of the current match of executive i and the matching value of
the current match of firm j. That is:
Vij < max[Viµ(i), Vµ(j)j ].
We denote V ij ≡ max[OCi, OCj ] and V ij ≡ max[Viµ(i), Vµ(j)j ]. More formally, for µ to be a
stable matching, the following conditions need to hold:
Vij < V ij , ∀ij /∈ µ, (2)
Vij > V ij , ∀ij ∈ µ. (3)
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2.3 Empirical method
The first part of the empirical model is a matching function determining the matching value of
the possible match between two agents. The matching value is unobserved and modeled as a latent
variable in the model. Without loss of generality, the matching function for CEO i and firm j can
be written as:
Vij = αWij + ηij ,∀ij ∈ Mt, (4)
where Wij contains observed characteristics of CEO i and firm j. ηij contains characteristics of
CEO i and firm j that are unobservable to econometricians and ηij ∼ N(0, ση).
The second part of the empirical model is the outcome equation; this determines the outcome
of all of the possible matches and the outcome variable Yij is only observed when ij is one of the
observed matches. The outcome equation of ij can be written as:
Yij = βXij + εij ,∀ij ∈ Mt, (5)
where Xij contains observed characteristics of CEO i and firm j. εij contains characteristics of
CEO i and firm j that are unobservable to econometricians, and εij ∼ N(0, σε).
Direct estimation of equation (5) leads to biased results as the matching decision between firm
i and manager j is not random but correlated with the error term in the equation (5) under
dimensions that cannot be observed by econometricians. This problem arises when εij and ηij are
correlated. To address this issue, it is convenient to assume εij = δηij + ξij , where ξij ∼ N(0, σξ).
Then σ2ε = δ2 + σ2ξ . If there is no correlation between εij and ηij then δ = 0.
To identify the parameters in the outcome equation, ideally an instrument should be exploited
that correlates with the matching decision of firms and CEOs but is independent from the out-
come of the match. According to Edmans et al. (2017), matching between CEOs and firms is a
complex and endogenous process involving various types of agents and third parties, rendering an
instrumental variable strategy infeasible. However, the matching nature of the problem suggests
that other agents participating in the same CEO labor market have an effect on the matching
decision. In a market, agents’ own characteristics are determinants of the matching value, but it
is the relative ranking that matters for the matching decision. Thus, a top-notch CEO can easily
match with a top-notch firm in a market where other agents’ abilities are normally distributed.
However, he might not be able to match with a top-notch firm if the ability distribution of other
CEO candidates participating in this market is left-skewed. These other agents’ characteristics
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are unlikely to have an effect on the performance of the matching. Under the key identification
assumption that the distribution of the agents in a particular market is exogenously given, we can
use the variation of other agents’ characteristics to identify the outcome equation and the incentive
effect.13
To estimate relevant parameters, we configure the likelihood function of the conditional proba-
bility of observing the matching value and the matched pair performance given the available data
and observed matching market structure. Based on the valuation and outcome equation system,
according to the error term structure, and denoting θ ≡ {α, β, δ, σξ}, the likelihood function is
given by:
L(Vij , Yij |θ,X,W ) = L(Yij |θ,X,W )× L(Vij |θ,X,W )




















There are two different ways to estimate the coefficients. The first method assumes matching
value information for observed matches, but not for unobserved matches. We can recover the
valuation bound for unobserved matches from the equilibrium matching condition. The second
approach is to use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method to simulate parameters block by block
conditional on all other information to recover the joint posterior distribution. I will principally
defer to the first method and discuss the second method in the robustness section that follows.
Assuming we have matching value information for observed matches, from the equilibrium
matching condition in Equation 2, the matching value for unobserved matches ij is upper bounded
by Vij , which is the larger value between the observed matches Viµ(i) and Vµ(j)j . Following Akkus
et al. (2016a), the likelihood function becomes:
L(Vij , Yij |θ,X,W ) = C ×
∏
ij∈µ













V ij − αXij
ση
)2,
leading to an estimation procedure similar to a two-stage Heckman estimation as follows.
13A more formal discussion about this identification strategy is provided in Sorensen (2007b).
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First, from the proxied matching value and the market equilibrium conditions, we obtain the
matching value upper bounds for all of the counterfactual matches. Because the counterfactual
matches cannot be blocking pairs, their matching values are upper bounded by the maximum of
the opportunity cost of the agents in the counterfactual matches.
Then, in the first stage estimation, we estimate the matching equation by carrying out a censored
regression for all possible matches in the market where the matching values for counterfactual
matches are truncated from above at V ij and the observed matches’ matching value is a given
value. We extract the residuals from the censored regression for use in the second stage regression.
In the second stage, we include these residuals as an additional regressor to control for unob-
served characteristics, in the spirit of the Heckman selection model’s second stage.
This method does not require a perfect measure for the matching value (Akkus et al., 2016b), as
that value purely represents a ranking of agents’ preferences. Therefore, a monotonic transformation
of the matching value would not change the preference order of the agents. Therefore, a perfect
measure of matching value is not needed provided the order of the matching value is reasonable.
The second advantage is that estimation complexity decreases compared with directly estimating
coefficients using maximum likelihood and Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, which makes
estimating the matching model more flexible.
The main drawbacks of the generalized selection method are that the estimator is less efficient
and the standard errors in the second stage are inconsistent. Therefore, we need to obtain consistent
standard errors from bootstrapping. A Monte Carlo exercise demonstrating the efficacy of the
method is discussed in Appendix A.
3 Data and estimation results
3.1 Data
This paper focuses on the CEO labor market for US S&P 1500 firms. I collect CEO-firm match
information when there is a succession event. I eliminate cases that involve turnover interim/acting
CEOs, CEO turnover associated with mergers and full acquisitions, spin-offs, CEO turnovers in-
volving co-CEOs, wrongly identified CEOs, new CEO tenure less than 12 months, non-listed firms
and firms for which stock price information is unavailable via CRSP data. Then I use both Exe-
cucomp and Boardex datasets to identify the career path of these new CEOs and their age at the
contracting year. The full sample contains 1645 S&P 1500 CEO firms’ matches from 1995 to 2011
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as I require 5-year rest matching performance.
I divide the matches in the sample into different markets according to the calendar year that
a firm hires a new CEO and assume the CEO labor market is segmented every calendar year
and independent from each other as in Pan (2015). There are 17 markets with 1645 executive-
firm matches. Firm standard characteristics data are taken from Compustat, and the incentive pay
measures mainly derive from the method developed by Core and Guay (2002); Naveen et al. (2006).
Salaries and total compensation data are from Execucomp. Table 2 presents summary statistics of
model variables. Following Bennedsen et al. (2007), I use the difference between firms’ three-year
average return on assets after the initial contracting year and firms’ three-year average return on
assets before the initial contracting year as the main performance measure. The two-year average
change in return on assets is used as the second performance measure. As many external factors
might influence firm performance, for the sake of robustness I also measure the performance of the
match in terms of whether the length of CEO tenure has passed a particular time, three or four
years.14 Hence, this measure is a good alternative and complements the previous accounting and
market measures of firm performance.
According to Edmans et al. (2017), there are three different measures of incentive pay that
suit different assumptions about the form of the production and cost functions. As the primary
performance measure is a ratio metric (return on assets) I assume the CEO has a multiplicative
effect on firm performance. Also, by assuming the CEO’s cost function is additive, then the best
incentive pay measure is the efficient dollar ownership. This is measured by the change in the
CEO’s wealth if the firm’s stock increases by 1%. Table 2 Panel B presents the natural logarithm
of the new CEO’s initial year incentive pay. Salary and Vega are the natural logarithms of initial
year amounts. Vega measures new CEOs’ initial risk-taking incentives as the natural logarithm of
executive wealth change if the firm’s annualized standard deviation of stock returns increases by
1%. Total Pay is the natural logarithm of the new CEO’s initial year total compensation. There
are three variables that capture CEOs’ characteristics. Age measures the CEO’s age at initial
contracting, male indicates the gender of the CEO and MBA measures whether the CEO has an
MBA degree. Leverage and market-to-book ratio both pertain to one year before the CEO-firm
match year and calculated following Leary and Roberts (2014).
14This measure is based on arguments from Allgood and Farrell (2003) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015); the CEO
turnover rate drops substantially after an initial three to four year period.
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Table 2. Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for US S&P 1500 firm-CEO matches from 1995 to 2011. Panel A reports the number
of firm-CEO matches in each calendar year. Panel B reports summary statistics for firms’ and CEOs’ characteristics. Age
measures the age of CEOs when they are initially matched with firms. Male indicates whether the CEO’s gender is male. MBA
captures whether the CEO has an MBA degree. Incentive pay is the natural logarithm of the CEO’s wealth increase when the
firm’s stock price increases by 1% during the first fiscal year following the match. Vega is the natural logarithm of the CEO’s
wealth increase when the firm’s stock volatility increases by 1% during the first fiscal year following the match; it measures
the CEO’s risk taking incentive. Salary is the natural logarithm of the CEO’s base salary in the first fiscal year following the
match. Total Pay is the natural logarithm of the CEO’s total compensation in the first fiscal year. Firm size is the natural
logarithm of total assets one fiscal year before the match. Leverage and market-to-book ratio are calculated following Leary
and Roberts (2014).
Panel A: Number of matches per year


















Panel B: Summary statistics
Variable Observation Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Age 1645 52.37 6.732 32 80
Male 1645 0.970 0.172 0 1
MBA 1645 0.388 0.487 0 1
Incentive pay 1645 4.498 1.514 0 10.692
Vega 1645 3.448 1.616 0 7.890
Salary 1645 6.234 0.783 0 7.664
Total Pay 1645 7.938 1.261 6.428 11.410
Firm size 1645 7.314 1.649 0 12.905
Leverage 1645 0.234 0.225 0 3.466
Market to book 1645 1.573 1.528 0.039 28.567
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3.2 Naive OLS results
This section presents results for the naive OLS regressions. Table 3 shows associations between
CEOs’ initial incentive pay and firm performance. I find a strong and positive relationship between
changes in firm performance and CEO incentive pay. A 1 percentage point increase in the incentive
firms provide to their new CEO will lead to firms’ performance increasing in terms of ROA within
the range of 1-1.66 percentage points (columns (1), (2), (3) and (4)).
Table 3. Performance as a function of incentive pay in naive OLS regression
This table presents naive OLS coefficient estimates showing that new CEOs’ initial incentive pay is positively associated with
different performance measures. The dependent variables are different measures of firm performance. In columns (1)-(3), firm
performance is defined as three-year average industry-adjusted ROA, it measures the industry adjusted average ROA increases
three years after CEO succession year to three years before the CEO succession year. In column (4), firm performance is
defined as two-year average industry-adjusted ROA, it measures the industry adjusted average ROA increases two years after
CEO succession year to two years before the CEO succession year. In columns (5)-(6), firm performance is defined as an
indicator variable equal to one if the new CEO passes a minimum tenure. Changes in profitability and firm value are computed
as differences between average three-year post-succession performance minus the three-year pre-succession average. The year
of succession is omitted. ROA and market-to-book ratio are defined following Leary and Roberts (2014). Incentive pay is the
new CEO’s first year incentive pay, measured as the natural logarithm of the CEO’s wealth increase if firm value increases by
1%. Other control variables are defined in Table 2. Robust T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: firm performance
∆ three-year ROA ∆ two-year ROA CEO minimum tenure
3 years 4 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incentive pay 0.0061*** 0.0095*** 0.0103*** 0.0092** 0.0290*** 0.0468***
(3.728) (3.097) (3.306) (2.343) (3.418) (4.714)
Age -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0009* -0.0063*** -0.0105***
(-1.512) (-1.644) (-1.674) (-4.264) (-6.448)
Male 0.0074 0.0077 0.0112 0.0592 0.0727
(0.569) (0.636) (0.833) (1.116) (1.211)
MBA 0.0057 0.0022 0.0012 -0.0034 0.0247
(1.181) (0.468) (0.225) (-0.204) (1.225)
Total Pay -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0033 0.0057 -0.0016
(-0.420) (-0.547) (-0.752) (0.487) (-0.124)
Salary 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0016 0.0335* 0.0572***
(0.110) (-0.130) (0.397) (1.867) (3.424)
Vega -0.0063*** -0.0039* -0.0022 -0.0152** -0.0160*
(-2.972) (-1.750) (-0.889) (-1.979) (-1.690)
Firm size 0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0097
(0.345) (-0.064) (-0.218) (-0.130) (-1.078)
Book leverage 0.0881* 0.0823 0.0926 0.0335 0.0550
(1.755) (1.547) (1.324) (0.906) (1.332)
Market-to-book 0.0043 0.0037 0.0026 -0.0140** -0.0110
(0.832) (0.746) (0.374) (-1.967) (-1.465)
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,599 1,599 1,599 1,623 1,645 1,645
R-squared 0.0078 0.0581 0.1044 0.0736 0.0630 0.0911
One could argue that other executives and external factors also influence firm performance.
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Therefore, in columns 5 and 6, I present results on measures with a pure CEO focus: the CEO
staying in the job more than three or four years. The linear probability models show that for a 1%
increase in CEOs’ initial incentive pay, CEO tenures are on average 2.9% more likely to pass the
three-year threshold and 4.7% more likely to pass the four-year threshold.
These results show that across different proxies for firm performance, new CEOs’ initial incentive
pay has a positive effect on firm performance. The results are significant both statistically and
economically. Overall, the results provide empirical support for the positive association between
new CEOs’ initial incentive pay and firm performance.
Unfortunately, this methodology does not allow us to distinguish between the incentive and
selection effects. The incentive pay that firms provide to their CEOs also attracts better CEOs
based on CEO attributes (Graham et al., 2013) and these CEO attributes are very likely to be
related to firm performance. Therefore, if other dimensions of CEO attributes exist that cannot be
captured and these dimensions are correlated with the choice of CEO-firm match, the estimated
coefficients will be biased. Also, because of the endogenous nature of the problem, a valid instrument
is hard to find. To overcome the endogeneity problem, I now turn to estimated results from the
matching model and the generalized selection method.
3.3 Generalized selection method results
3.3.1 Main results
According to the estimation method discussed in Section 2, we need to have a valid proxy for the
matching value of CEOs and firms. The matching value needs to represent agents’ preferences over
different matches. In Gabaix and Landier (2008)’s assignment model, CEOs and firms are matching
on firm size. The best CEO matches with the largest firm, whilst the second best CEO matches with
the second largest firm. The main measure of firm size is the firm’s total market capitalization.
Similarly, I use the natural logarithm of the firm’s total market capitalization at the first fiscal
year end after the new CEO takes the job as the proxy for the matching value. I present the
estimated results of the matching equation in Table 4. Unfortunately, we cannot directly interpret
the coefficients as the matching equation purely estimates the preferences of agents. However,
we can still interpret the relative importance of different independent variables. In explaining
matching value variation, firm size and market to book ratio are the two largest factors. Results
show that incentive pay is estimated to be the third largest effect factor on matching value variation,
well above other compensation factors: compensation Vega, Base salary and Total pay during the
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first year. Hence, these results provide strong evidence for the importance of incentive pay on
CEO-firm matching value. In column (2) and column (3), I split the market into two periods.
During both periods, the incentive is positive, significant, and of similar magnitude. This indicates
agents’ incentive preferences do not change much over time. Comparing the matching equation
estimation in the two periods, another interesting finding is that the coefficient associated with
CEO compensation Vega is still significant during the first half of the sample period 1995 to 2004.
However, during the second half of the sample period, Vega not only decreases in magnitude but
also becomes insignificant. This finding indicates incentive pay is important and stable through
time, but compensation Vega is less so.
Table 4. Matching equation estimation
This table presents censored regression coefficient estimates of the matching equation. Matching values of observed matches are
measured by the natural logarithm of firm-level market capitalization at the first fiscal year end after the new CEO has been
hired. The censored regression includes all observed CEO-firm matches and all counterfactual CEO-firm matches. Coefficient
estimates in columns (1)-(3) pertain to censored regressions under the full 1995-2011 sample, the 1995-2004 sub-sample, and
the 2005-2011 sub-sample, respectively. Incentive pay is the new CEO’s first year incentive pay, measured as the natural
logarithm of the CEO’s wealth increase if the firm’s value increases by 1%. Other control variables are defined in Table 2. ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Market cap
1995-2011 1995-2004 2005-2011
(1) (2) (3)
Incentive pay 0.2455*** 0.2547*** 0.2375***
(18.572) (14.930) (11.048)
Age 0.0037** 0.0033 0.0045
(1.970) (1.339) (1.491)
Male 0.0780 0.1456 0.0782
(1.016) (1.194) (0.778)
MBA 0.0113 0.0126 0.0145
(0.412) (0.340) (0.362)
Salary 0.0505** 0.0362 0.0628
(2.270) (1.414) (1.386)
Vega 0.0409*** 0.0625*** 0.0185
(3.247) (3.251) (1.031)
Total Pay 0.0586*** 0.0403* 0.0626**
(3.476) (1.793) (2.350)
Firm size 0.5435*** 0.5352*** 0.5762***
(41.193) (31.444) (27.393)
Book leverage -0.5317*** -0.2871*** -0.7448***
(-8.802) (-2.811) (-8.050)
Market-to-book 0.1772*** 0.1817*** 0.2035***
(22.626) (16.228) (15.492)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 167,461 88,550 78,911
After estimating the censored regression, I extract the residuals and add them into the out-
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come equation to control for selection. Table 5 shows the coefficients estimated from the outcome
equation. These estimated coefficients control for the endogenous matching between firms and
CEOs with the matching equation from Table 4 Column (1). In all cases, the coefficient associated
with Incentive pay is positive and significant but smaller than the corresponding OLS estimated
coefficients in Table 3 from column (1)-(3). The difference is controlled by including the matching
residual in the regression. In all cases, coefficients associated with Matching residual are positive
and significant. This indicates that unobserved agents’ characteristics have an effect on matching
values and also on matching outcomes. This highlights the key point of the paper: controlling for
matching is crucial given its large quantitative effect. Lastly, comparing model R2 between the
OLS regression and the outcome equation after controlling for matching, we can observe that R2
in Table 5 column (1)-(3) increases by 150%, 19%, and 11.5% respectively. These results show that
the pattern of matching is particularly informative about the variation in firm performance.
In Panel B, I test for coefficient differences between the naive OLS regression and the matching
corrected outcome equation. In all cases, the effect of CEO incentives on firm performance decreases
by more than 10% in economic magnitude and the difference is statistically significant. The total
effect of a 1% increase in CEO incentive pay is a 1.72% increase in firm performance (Table 3 column
(3)), divided between an incentive effect of 1.51% and a selection effect of 0.21%. Therefore, the
selection effect accounts for 12.7% of the total effect, whilst the incentive effect dominates with
87.3%.
3.3.2 Outcome equation time trend estimation
In Table 4, I show that agents’ matching value preferences change over time. Therefore, the
influence of these characteristics on firm performance could also evolve. In Table 6, I estimate the
OLS regression and the outcome equation with matching residuals over two different periods. In
columns (1) and (2) I estimate the model during the first half of the total sample period from
1995 to 2004. In columns (3) and (4) I estimate the model during the second half of the total
sample period from 2005 to 2011. During the first half the sample period, the coefficient associated
with matching residuals is insignificant, thus the difference between the incentive pay coefficients
is trivial. Therefore, in the early years, the estimated selection effect is very weak. During the
second half of the sample period, the coefficient associated with matching residuals is positive and
significant. The difference between the incentive pay coefficients in the naive OLS and matching
corrected outcome equation is 18% of the total effect estimated in the naive OLS regression. This
50
Table 5. Main results
Panel A presents outcome equation estimation results on firm performance adding the matching residuals in the regression.
The dependent variable is defined as three-year average industry-adjusted ROA, it measures the industry adjusted average
ROA increases three years after CEO succession year to three years before the CEO succession year. The year of succession
is omitted. The three different specifications are comparable with columns (1)-(3) in Table 3. The matching residuals are
computed from Table 4 column (1). Panel B provides Hausman test results concerning differences in incentive pay coefficients
and the relative change in magnitude after adding the matching residuals. Incentive pay is the new CEO’s first year incentive
pay, measured as the natural logarithm of the CEO’s wealth increase if firm value increases by 1%. Matching residuals are
extracted from the first stage censored regression. Other control variables are defined in Table 2. Bootstrapped Z-statistics are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Outcome equation estimation
Dependent variable: ∆ ROA
(1) (2) (3)














Firm size -0.0009 -0.0028
(-0.191) (-0.727)




Matching residual 0.0157*** 0.0156*** 0.0166***
(3.408) (2.655) (3.499)
Industry FE No No Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Location FE No No Yes
Observations 1,599 1,599 1,599
R-squared 0.0201 0.0692 0.1165
Panel B: Changes in Incentive pay’s coefficients
Difference 0.0025*** 0.0011** 0.0013**
Relative change 40.9% 11.8% 12.7%
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result highlights that, over time, the selection effect becomes more pronounced. The total effect
of the incentive on firm performance increases by 57%, although the relative magnitude of the
selection effect more than triples, increasing from 5.47% to 18% of the total effect. The absolute
effect increases 5-fold.
Table 6. Outcome equation estimation time trend
This table shows the results of estimating the outcome equation including matching residuals over time. Columns (1) and
(3) contain OLS regression coefficient estimates. Columns (2) and (4) pertain to second stage regressions after estimating
sub-period censored regressions in Table 4 columns (2) and (3), respectively. The dependent variable is defined as three-year
average industry-adjusted ROA, it measures the industry adjusted average ROA increases three years after CEO succession
year to three years before the CEO succession year. The year of succession is omitted. Incentive pay is the new CEO’s first
year incentive pay, measured as the natural logarithm of the CEO’s wealth increase if firm value increases by 1%. Matching
residual is the residual extracted from the first stage censored regression of estimating the matching equation. Other control
variables are defined in Table 2. Bootstrapped Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆ ROA
1995-2004 2005-2011
Naive OLS Outcome equation Naive OLS Outcome equation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentive pay 0.0087** 0.0082** 0.0136** 0.0112**
(2.287) (2.264) (2.562) (2.008)
Age -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0001 0.0002
(-2.094) (-2.448) (-0.116) (0.239)
Male -0.0070 -0.0068 0.0139 0.0098
(-0.372) (-0.349) (0.761) (0.512)
MBA 0.0088 0.0095 -0.0070 -0.0070
(1.291) (1.297) (-0.928) (-0.927)
Total Pay -0.0036 -0.0036 0.0009 -0.0005
(-0.693) (-0.642) (0.141) (-0.071)
Salary -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0010 0.0008
(-0.145) (-0.172) (0.097) (0.078)
Vega -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0052* -0.0045
(-1.224) (-0.853) (-1.860) (-1.541)
Firm size 0.0042 0.0033 -0.0063 -0.0107*
(0.903) (0.741) (-1.194) (-1.885)
Book leverage 0.0583* 0.0602** 0.0890 0.0872
(1.871) (2.434) (1.027) (1.115)
Market-to-book 0.0022 0.0018 0.0040 0.0023
(0.580) (0.636) (0.273) (0.165)
Matching residual 0.0068 0.0300***
(1.095) (2.707)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 883 883 716 716
R-squared 0.1291 0.1313 0.1048 0.1388
There are two potential and plausible explanations for this increase in the selection effect over
time. The first explanation relates to increased monitoring by boards of directors following the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as the 2004 NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules strength-
ening board and committee independence. After 2004, the listing rules changed. US public traded
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firms need to have a majority of independent directors and full independence in nomination, com-
pensation, and auditing committees. Because independent directors are on average more likely to
serve as monitors of executives, the post-rule change period is associated with an increase in board
monitoring (Knyazeva et al., 2013; Guo and Masulis, 2015). This increase in monitoring substitutes
away the need for the incentive effect. Therefore, the relative importance of the selection effect
increases. The second explanation relates to the motivation effect from CEOs’ career concerns
(Fama, 1980). If the talent mobility decreases, then, on the one hand, the probability for CEOs
jump to better jobs decreases. On the other hand, the firing probability for CEOs also decreases
since the cost of firing CEO increases for firms when there is no external talent market. Therefore
the career concern for CEO decreases and firms need to provide extra incentive effect relative to
selection effect to motivate the same talent level of CEOs when the CEO talent mobility decreases.
3.3.3 Industry talent mobility
The foregoing results suggest that the selection effect of incentive pay is not trivial in influencing
firm performance. We expect this effect to be stronger in industries that exhibit a higher degree of
talent mobility. In Panel A of Table 7, I show the degree of CEO talent mobility in different Fama-
French 5 industries. Similar to Cremers and Grinstein (2014), I measure CEO talent mobility as the
percentage of new CEOs that an industry hired from outside the firm from 1995 to 2011. During
the sample period, 36% of the new CEOs hired in HiTec industry are from outside of the firm.
Other industries’ external CEO hire rates are all below 30%, much lower than the HiTec industry.
Therefore, I would expect the selection effect is stronger in HiTec than in other industries. In Panel
B, I estimate naive OLS regressions and corresponding matching corrected outcome equations for
Non-HiTec and HiTec industries respectively. From the estimated results, the selection effects on
firm performance in Non-HiTec industries are small both in terms of economic magnitude and
statistical significance. The selection effect accounts for almost 20% of the total effect in HiTec
industry.
Overall, the estimation results show that both the incentive effect and the selection effect of
CEO’s initial incentive pay on firm performance are important. The incentive effect accounts for
87% of the total effect and the selection effect accounts for 13% of the total effect. Increased
monitoring and more talent mobility both increase the importance of the selection effect.
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Table 7. Talent mobility
This table presents split sample estimation results based on CEO talent mobility at the Fama-French 5 industry level. Panel A
shows the rate at which new CEOs are hired from outside the firm in a specific Fama-French 5 industry. Columns (1) and (3)
in Panel B are OLS regression coefficient estimates. Columns (2) and (4) pertain to second stage regressions after estimating
sub-sample censored regressions in different industries. The dependent variable is as three-year average industry-adjusted ROA,
it measures the industry adjusted average ROA increases three years after CEO succession year to three years before the CEO
succession year. The year of succession is omitted. Incentive pay is the new CEO’s first year incentive pay, measured as the
natural logarithm of the CEO’s wealth increase if firm value increases by 1%. Matching residual is the residual extracted
from the first stage censored regression of the estimating matching equation. Other control variables are defined in Table 2.
Bootstrapped Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Talent mobility within industries






Panel B: Regressions on different industries
Dependent variable: ∆ ROA
Non-HiTec industies HiTec industy
Naive OLS Outcome equation Naive OLS Outcome equation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentive pay 0.0058** 0.0054** 0.0279** 0.0233**
(2.084) (2.104) (2.243) (1.968)
Matching residual 0.0063 0.0473***
(1.370) (2.702)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,280 1,280 319 319
R-squared 0.0665 0.0697 0.3332 0.3711
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4 Robustness
4.1 Alternative market definition
The key assumption on identification is that the distribution of agents in the market is ex-
ogenously given. This assumption would not be valid if CEOs or firms choose to participate in a
market based on the unobserved characteristics of the market. For instance, if good companies,
in general, are more likely to end their CEOs’ contracts in even years, then this attracts better
candidates to wait and more likely to participate in the labour market in even years. Therefore,
if we change the market definition, the estimated coefficients will change compared to the main
results because agents select between calendar years.
In Panel A of Table 8, I change the market definition to two calendar years and three calendar
years. The estimated coefficients are mostly unchanged. Panel B provides similar test on coeffi-
cients difference between naive OLS regressions and selection controlled outcome regressions. The
magnitude and statistical significance are similar to the results in In Panel B of Table 5. These
results show that the analysis is not sensitive to the specific market definition, and provide evidence
on the validation of the identification assumption.
4.2 Alternative matching value proxies
According to Gabaix and Landier (2008), the firm’s market capitalization is a good proxy for
CEO-firm matching value. However, the findings could still be sensitive to the choice of value
measure on CEO-firm matching. In this section, I use the market-to-book ratio as a new proxy
for matching value to investigate the sensitivity of matching value choices on outcome equation
estimates.
The firm market-to-book ratio offers a good alternative when it is valid to argue that firms and
CEOs have a long horizon and all prefer high growth potential to current large size. Therefore,
future benefits are more important. In Table 9, I use firms’ fiscal year-end market-to-book ratio
after the match with their new CEOs. Compared with column (1) in Table 5 and Table 9, overall,
results remain similar but with some minor changes in the magnitude of coefficients associated with
matching residuals and the corresponding R2s; both values become larger. These findings indicate
that using the market to book ratio as a proxy for matching value might offer more matching
specific information that influences firm performance.
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Table 8. Robustness: alternative market definition
Panel A presents outcome equation estimation results on firm performance adding the matching residuals in the regression.
The matching market is redefined as two calendar years or three calendar years instead of one in main results. The dependent
variable is defined as three-year average industry-adjusted ROA, it measures the industry adjusted average ROA increases
three years after CEO succession year to three years before the CEO succession year. The year of succession is omitted. The
three different specifications are comparable with columns (1)-(3) in Table 3. The matching residuals are computed similar
to Table 4 column (1) but with different market definition. Panel B provides Hausman test results concerning differences in
incentive pay coefficients and the relative change in magnitude after adding the matching residuals. Incentive pay is the new
CEO’s first year incentive pay, measured as the natural logarithm of the CEO’s wealth increase if firm value increases by
1%. Matching residuals are extracted from the first stage censored regression. Other control variables are defined in Table 2.
Bootstrapped Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Outcome equation estimation
Dependent variable: ∆ ROA
Two calendar years Three calendar years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incentive pay 0.0032** 0.0082*** 0.0089*** 0.0036** 0.0084** 0.0089***
(2.110) (3.728) (3.090) (2.192) (2.448) (3.038)
Age -0.0006 -0.0007* -0.0006 -0.0007
(-1.283) (-1.733) (-1.433) (-1.414)
Male 0.0063 0.0061 0.0055 0.0062
(0.614) (0.546) (0.434) (0.544)
MBA 0.0067 0.0032 0.0066* 0.0032
(1.253) (0.677) (1.767) (0.642)
Total Pay -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0025
(-0.524) (-0.585) (-0.484) (-0.673)
Salary 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0004
(0.130) (-0.148) (0.179) (-0.099)
Vega -0.0059*** -0.0036* -0.0062*** -0.0035*
(-2.884) (-1.730) (-3.297) (-1.647)
Firm size -0.0013 -0.0029 -0.0008 -0.0029
(-0.287) (-0.819) (-0.161) (-0.679)
Book leverage 0.0890* 0.0837 0.0887* 0.0837*
(1.800) (1.438) (1.864) (1.903)
Market-to-book 0.0032 0.0026 0.0033 0.0026
(0.638) (0.480) (0.720) (0.555)
Matching residual 0.0172*** 0.0174*** 0.0166*** 0.0145*** 0.0142*** 0.0166***
(4.028) (3.257) (3.562) (3.233) (2.695) (3.108)
Industry FE No No Yes No No Yes
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Location FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,599 1,599 1,599 1,599 1,599 1,599
R-squared 0.0228 0.0719 0.1165 0.0185 0.0675 0.1165
Panel B: Changes in Incentive pay’s coefficients
Difference 0.0029** 0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0025*** 0.0011** 0.0014**
Relative change 47.5% 13.7% 13.6% 41.0% 11.6% 13.6%
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Table 9. Robustness: alternative matching value proxy
This table presents the estimation results for both matching and outcome equations using the fiscal year end market-to-book
ratio after succession as a proxy for matching value. Column (1) estimates a censored regression for all potential matches
in markets. Columns (2)-(4) estimate the outcome equation together with the Matching residual to control for endogenous
matching. The dependent variable is defined as three-year average industry-adjusted ROA, it measures the industry adjusted
average ROA increases three years after CEO succession year to three years before the CEO succession year. . The year of
succession is omitted. Incentive pay is the new CEO’s first year incentive pay, measured as the natural logarithm of the CEO’s
wealth increase if firm value increases by 1%. Matching residual is the residual extracted from the first stage censored regression.
Other control variables are defined in Table 2. Bootstrapped Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Matching equation Outcome equation estimation
∆ ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentive pay 0.1252*** 0.0032* 0.0074** 0.0080**
(8.634) (1.682) (2.190) (2.563)
Age -0.0060*** -0.0009** -0.0010**
(-2.638) (-1.961) (-2.570)
Male 0.0065 0.0069 0.0073
(0.076) (0.452) (0.518)
MBA -0.0025 0.0031 -0.0001
(-0.083) (0.645) (-0.020)
Salary -0.0086 0.0012 -0.0003
(-0.365) (0.269) (-0.089)
Vega -0.0301** -0.0058*** -0.0033
(-2.168) (-3.550) (-1.373)
Total Pay -0.0133 -0.0029 -0.0034
(-0.834) (-0.705) (-0.825)
Firm size -0.0405*** 0.0045 0.0028
(-3.071) (1.155) (0.957)
Book leverage 0.4585*** 0.0811** 0.0751*
(5.800) (2.158) (1.747)
Market-to-book 0.3801*** -0.0076 -0.0087
(33.449) (-1.176) (-1.281)
Matching residual 0.0250* 0.0322** 0.0338**
(1.802) (2.516) (2.082)
Industry FE Yes No No Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes
Location FE Yes No No Yes
Observations 164,330 1,570 1,570 1,570
R-squared 0.0611 0.1134 0.1601
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4.3 Alternative performance measures
In the above analysis, the main measure of firm performance is the change in industry-adjusted
return on assets over seven-year window during CEO succession. In order to show the result is
not comes from manipulating the estimation window I use return on assets over four-year window
during CEO succession as a robust test.
I estimate a matching corrected outcome equation that uses two years’ change in return on
asset as the performance measure in Table 10 column (1). The first stage matching equation is the
same as in Table 4 column (1). The coefficient associated with matching residuals is also positive
and significant. The difference in incentive effect is 0.05, which accounts for 9% of the total effect
of incentives on firm value.
Next, we focus on an internal measure of CEO performance: CEO tenure. I use a dummy
variable to capture whether the CEO’s tenure passes three years or four years, given that a typical
CEO employment agreement’s term is three years with automatic extension for one more year if
mutually agreed between the CEO and the firm. I examine the effect of incentive pay on CEO
tenure in Table 10 Column (2) and (3). The coefficients of matching residuals are both positive
and significant with slightly less importance attributable to the selection effect. In all cases, using
a matching model to correct for selection is necessary.
4.4 Markov Chain Monte Carlo
One drawback of this generalized selection method is that if the measurement errors associated
with matching value increase, the coefficient associated with the matching residuals in the second
stage will suffer from attenuation bias. Therefore, the coefficient is less reliable and should be
interpreted with caution.
In this section, I explore robustness to an alternative estimation method that does not involve
finding proxies for matching value. Assuming the matching value for observed matches cannot be
observed and the joint distribution of (εij , ηij) is independent for different matches and follows the











We can use a full information estimator to estimate the coefficients. There are two ways to estimate
this full information estimator: maximum likelihood and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). The
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Table 10. Robustness: alternative outcome variables
This table presents the estimation results for the outcome equation under different performance measures using fiscal year-end
total market capitalization after succession as a proxy for matching value. The dependent variable in column (1) is defined
as firm performance is defined as two-year average industry-adjusted ROA, it measures the industry adjusted average ROA
increases two years after CEO succession year to two years before the CEO succession year. The year of succession is omitted.
The dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) captures whether the new CEO’s tenure lasts for at least 3 years, or 4 years,
respectively. The year of succession is omitted. Incentive pay is the new CEO’s first year incentive pay, measured as the natural
logarithm of the CEO’s wealth increase if firm value increases by 1%. Matching residual is the residual extracted from the first
stage censored regression. Other control variables are defined in Table 2. Bootstrapped Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
∆ two-year ROA CEO minimum tenure
3 years 4 years
(1) (2) (3)
Incentive pay 0.0073** 0.0259*** 0.0443***
(2.086) (3.196) (4.998)
Age -0.0008 -0.0060*** -0.0103***
(-1.395) (-4.500) (-6.886)
Male 0.0098 0.0566 0.0707
(0.771) (1.014) (1.080)
MBA 0.0023 -0.0014 0.0263
(0.457) (-0.099) (1.166)
Salary 0.0017 0.0336** 0.0574***
(0.307) (2.448) (2.964)
Vega -0.0017 -0.0143** -0.0153*
(-0.716) (-2.190) (-1.875)
Total Pay -0.0039 0.0046 -0.0025
(-1.129) (0.378) (-0.153)
Firm size -0.0048 -0.0072 -0.0146
(-0.624) (-0.965) (-1.470)
Book leverage 0.0942 0.0365 0.0573**
(1.543) (0.992) (2.005)
Market-to-book 0.0013 -0.0165** -0.0129*
(0.246) (-1.988) (-1.799)
Matching residual 0.0225*** 0.0406*** 0.0320**
(2.968) (3.042) (2.292)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,610 1,645 1,645
Observations 1,623 1,645 1,645
R-squared 0.0897 0.0699 0.0940
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maximum likelihood method is computationally intensive because of the matching nature of the
problem. For illustrative purposes, I compare MCMC to the Heckman selection model.
Recall that the selection function for a Heckman selection model is a simple probit model and
error terms are independent of each other. Assuming a Heckman selection model with a similar
form to the matching model:
Vi = αWi + ηi,
Yi = βXi + εi,
and agent i will be selected if Vi > 0 and Yi can only be observed when Vi > 0. Error terms are
jointly normally distributed with zero mean and correlation of δ. Then the probability of agent i
being selected is:
Pr(Vi > 0|Wi) = Pr(ηi > −αWi|Wi)
=
∫
1[ηi > −αWi]dF (ηi),









1[ηi > −αWi]dF (ηi),
where we assume N total observations and N0 observations cannot be observed. The likelihood
function can factor into a product over the likelihood of each observation’s selection choice because
one agent’s decision is independent of others’ decisions. However, in the matching model, the
probability that a pair ij is matched:
Pr(Vij > Vij |Wij) = Pr(ηij > Vij − αWij |Wij)
=
∫
1[ηij > Vij − αWij ]dF (ηij),
where, from the equilibrium characterization V ij also depends on other agents’ characteristics in
the market, as V ij depends on other agents’ characteristics in the market and error terms are
correlated with each other. Therefore, this simple probability becomes high dimensional:




1[ηij > Vij − αWij ]dF (ηij)dF (ηij+1)dF (ηi+1j)...,
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this makes the likelihood function high dimensional integration and it cannot be factored out
compared with the situation in the Heckman selection model. Solving the integration directly is not
computationally feasible. To circumvent this complexity, I defer to a Bayesian method. Based on a
Gibbs sampling algorithm and data augmentation (Tanner and Wong, 1987; Albert and Chib, 1993),
the method simulates parameters block by block conditional on all other information to recover the
joint posterior distribution. This transforms an integration problem into a simulation problem and
reduces the computational complexity substantially. The detailed estimation procedure is discussed
in the Appendix B.
The matching equation estimation results under MCMC are presented in Table 11 Column (2).
The coefficient associated with Incentive is positive and significant, thus firms providing higher
incentives have higher matching value and are on average more attractive to CEOs. Firms providing
high incentives could be firms with better sources or larger capacities; working for these types of
firms could make it easier for CEOs to transfer their abilities to real productivity. Table 11 Column
(1) shows the coefficients estimated from the outcome equation. These estimated coefficients are
controlled for endogenous matching between firms and CEOs. The coefficients associated with
Incentive are positive and significant and of a similar magnitude as in Table 10 Column (1). δ is
the correlation between unobservables between the outcome and valuation equations. This positive
and significant result also indicates the necessity to control for endogenous matching.
Overall, the findings in the main analysis are robust to alternative matching value proxies, al-
ternative CEO labor market definitions, different performance measures and alternative estimation
methods.
5 Conclusion
This paper finds that higher initial CEO incentive pay is associated with better performance.
To disentangle the incentive and selection effects from incentive pay, I estimate a matching model
to control for the selection effect. In that model, matching decisions not only depend on matched
agents’ characteristics but also on other agents’ characteristics in the market. This method cir-
cumvents the need to identify instrumental variables in studying CEO-firm matching. These other
agents’ characteristics have an effect on matching decisions but not on the final output of the
matching; this feature provides exogenous variation in identifying the outcome equation.
In the sample of 1645 CEO-firm matches from 1995 to 2011, both the incentive effect and
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Table 11. MCMC estimation results
The table presents Bayesian parameter estimates for the two equations in the structural model. The dependent variable in the
outcome equation is defined as three-year average industry-adjusted ROA, it measures the industry adjusted average ROA
increases three years after CEO succession year to three years before the CEO succession year. The dependent variable in the
matching equation is the latent valuation variable. Coefficient magnitudes in the matching equation are not interpretable in
economic terms because they represent preferences. Estimations are based on 200,000 simulations of the posterior distribution.
The initial 100,000 simulations are discarded for burn-in. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: ∆ three-year ROA
Outcome equation Matching equation
(1) (2)














Firm size 0.039 0.232***
(0.809) (3.264)






Industry yummy Yes Yes
Location dummy Yes Yes
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selection effect have significantly influence firm performance. The incentive and selection effects
account, respectively, for 87.3% and 12.7% of the total incentive pay effect on performance. The
selection effect becomes more pronounced after 2004, when governance monitoring and talent mo-
bility both started to increase. The selection effect is also stronger in the HiTec industry where
CEO talent mobility is higher.
The results in this paper have important policy implications in terms of how best to regulate
CEO incentive pay. For instance, in regulating CEO incentives, regulators should not only examine
the incentive effect but also be aware of the existence of the selection effect. A simple incentive cap
might have unintended consequences that serve to decrease the supply of top talents.
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A Appendix: Monte Carlo Exercise
This section presents a Monte Carlo exercise to demonstrate the effectiveness of the two-step
estimation method. The simulated dataset contains one single market where 50 CEOs and 50 firms
are the participants. Each agent exhibits only one observed characteristic. Matching values and all
possible outcomes of matched pairs are generated from the equation system that:
Vij = βcXCi + βfXFj + ηij ,
Yij = αcXCi + αfXFj + εij ,
where εij = δηij + ξij . In the equation system, all agents’ characteristics: XCi, XFj , ηij and εij
are drawn from a normal distribution that N(0, 4). The true coefficients in the equation system are
set as follows: βc = 0.3, βf = 0.3, αc = 0.2, αf = 0.2 and δ = 0.2. The simulated dataset contains
the matching values and outcomes of all possible matches. To determine a stable match, I adapt
the following top-down elimination algorithm.
In the first step, I find the maximum matching value in the market and the corresponding CEO
and firm ID. In the market there are no blocking pairs that can block this match, thus the match
pair that generates the maximum matching value much be stable.
In the second step, assuming CEO i and firm j generate the maximum matching value, I
eliminate all matches containing CEO i or firm j.
Then, for the remaining matches in the market I repeat the algorithm from the first step until
there is only one match existing in the market. Finally, I collect all of the matches selected from
these iterations and form the stable match.
A1. Single market Monte Carlo exercises
This table presents biased OLS regression and matching corrected regression coefficient estimates based on a simulated dataset
containing 50 CEOs and 50 firms in one single market. Results present the findings from 100 replications of a one-to-one
matching market. Simulated stable matching is generated from the top-down elimination algorithm. The Column 1 shows the
true values for each coefficient. Column 2 shows the biased OLS coefficient estimates ignoring matching correction. Column 3
represents the matching corrected estimation results with bootstrapped standard errors. Z-values are presented in parentheses.
True value OLS bias Matching corrected result bias
Mean RSME Mean RSME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
αc 0.2 0.029 0.086 0.002 0.081
αf 0.2 0.029 0.064 -0.000 0.064
δ 0.2 0.003 0.085
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B Appendix: MCMC Estimation






ijβ + εij ,
εij = ηijδ + ξij ,
What we observe: Wij , Xij , µij ; Yij if ij ∈ µ
Latent variables: Vij , Yij if ij /∈ µ;
Coefficients: α, β, δ, σ.
Let’s assume θ contains all the parameters in the model, θ ≡ (α, β, δ).
I assume δ ≥ 0 and the prior distribution that α0 ∼ N(0, 10I), β0 ∼ N(0, 10I) and δ0 ∼ N(0, 10).
Then the estimation procedure is as follows:
• First, draw Vij , Y ∗ij |β, α, δ, σ, data
– For Yij observed:







and truncated from below at Vij .
– For Yij not observed:
Vij , |β, α, δ, σ2ξ , data ∼ Normal(αWij , ση),
and truncated from above at Vij .
Y ∗ij |β, α, δ, σ2ξ , data ∼ Normal(βXij + δ(Vij − αWij), σ2ξ )
• Second, draw β, α|Vij , Y ∗ij , δ, σ2, data from a Bayesian Seeming Unrelated Regression of [Y ∗;V ]
on [X;W ] with Normal priors on β and α and know covariance matrix Ω:
β, α|Vij , Y ∗ij , δ, σ, data ∼ Normal((C ′Ω−1C +A)−1(C ′Ω−1][Y ∗;V ] +Aµ), (C ′Ω−1C +A)−1),
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• Third, draw δ, σ|β, α, V, Y ∗, data from a Bayesian regression of Y − βX on V − αW , with
Normal-IG priors.
• Fourth, repeat. 15
15Based on Sorensen (2007a), and Korteweg (2013).
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Chapter IV
The Impact of Broker Reputation on Analyst
Forecast Accuracy
1 Introduction
Sell-side analysts play an important role in gathering, analyzing, and distributing information in
financial markets. Their behavior attracts the attention of other market participants, particularly
when they issue their earnings forecasts. These forecasts are the analysts’ most important outputs,
and analysts have strong incentives to make better predictions. Mikhail et al. (1999), Hong et al.
(2000), and Groysberg et al. (2011) show that more accurate forecasts can help analysts avoid job
termination or move down to less reputable brokerage firms, especially for early career analysts.
Also, Stickel (1992) and Groysberg et al. (2011) show that analysts with greater forecast accuracy
are more likely to be nominated as “All-star” analysts and earn higher compensation.
We find that new analysts working for more reputable brokerage firms are more likely to make
greater forecast accuracy. Two confounding effects drive our findings: the direct effect (influence)
that more reputable brokerage firms have more resources and help analysts make greater accurate
forecasts; and the indirect effect (sorting), whereby more reputable brokerage firms attract more
talented analysts, who thus forecast better. Our main contribution is to utilize a two-sided matching
model to disentangle these two effects and quantify their relative importance in determining analyst
forecast accuracy. We find that both effects are important, and the influence effect accounts for
73% of the total effect of brokerage firms’ reputation on analyst forecast accuracy, while the sorting
effect accounts for the remaining 27%.
More reputable brokerage houses can help their new analysts improve their forecast accuracy in
several ways. First, analysts working for more reputable brokerage firms may have access to better
data and research support (Clement, 1999). Better information acquisition and analysis in more
reputable brokerage houses lead to more accurate forecast results. Second, analysts working for
more reputable brokerage firms may have better personal communication opportunities with the
management teams they follow (Clement, 1999), and private interactions with these teams is one
of the most influential factors that determine forecast accuracy (Soltes, 2013; Brown et al., 2015).
Sorting captures the effect that better-talented analysts are attracted to work for more reputable
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brokerage firms. Therefore, even if brokerage firms’ reputations have no direct impact on analysts’
forecast performance, we still observe that analysts who work for higher-reputation brokerage firms
perform better, because the sorting effect leads to positive assortative matching between analysts’
individual talent and broker reputation.
Distinguishing these two effects is challenging. Brokerage firm reputation becomes endogenous
when better-talented analysts work for more reputable firms, and analysts’ talent cannot be per-
fectly measured. The unobserved part of talent can then be correlated with the brokerage firm
reputation measure, and the estimated direct effect of brokerage firm reputation will be biased
upward. This concern increases when we focus on new analysts where the datasets contain little
information on their abilities. The ideal solution to this endogeneity problem is to find an in-
strumental variable that correlates with brokerage firms’ reputation and is independent of analyst
forecast accuracy through other channels. However, the matching decision between analysts and
brokerage firms are mutual choices, and it is a complicated process involving a number of observable
and unobservable factors. No valid instruments currently exist.
Instead, we use a structural approach similar to Sorensen (2007a) to overcome this missing IV
problem. Our structural model contains two key elements: first, an outcome equation that models
the determinants of analysts forecast accuracy, and second, a one-to-many associative matching
model that controls for sorting. The matching model explicitly models the matching process be-
tween analysts and brokerage firms and allows for matching decisions to interact with different
agents. The matching decision interaction between agents creates difficulties in estimating the
model, but also provides a rank order property that is useful for identification. The rank order
property of the two-sided matching model means that the matching decision depends on the rela-
tive ranking of the agents in the market. Therefore, it not only depends on the characteristics of
the matched agents themselves, but also on the other agents’ characteristics. If the agents’ char-
acteristics vary exogenously across the market, we can identify the sorting effect by comparing the
performance difference between analysts of different quality but match with brokerage firms with
similar reputations in different markets. Similarly, we can identify the influence effect by comparing
the performance difference between analysts with similar quality but match with brokerage firms
with different reputation in different markets.
The key identification assumption is that agents are exogenously assigned across different mar-
kets. That is, we need sufficient variation across the new analyst labour market, and agents cannot
choose to participate in a particular market for reasons correlated with the agents’ characteristics in
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that market. In this study, we assume the new analyst labour market is segregated by the calendar
year and geographically. A similar identification assumption has been made in Sorensen (2007a),
Park (2013), Chen (2014), Ni and Srinivasan (2015), Pan (2015), Akkus et al. (2016a), and Xia
(2018).
Agents’ matching decisions interact, so any analysis of the likelihood function of one agent’s
decision must also take account of other agents’ decisions. The likelihood function then becomes a
high dimensional integral function and it cannot be factored out, as in the standard Heckman se-
lection model (Heckman, 1979) where agents’ decisions are independent of each other. To overcome
the numerical difficulty in solving the high dimensional integration problem, we apply a Bayesian
approach, use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to transform the integration prob-
lem into a simulation problem to make estimation feasible (Tanner and Wong, 1987; Albert and
Chib, 1993; Sorensen, 2007a; Park, 2013; Chen, 2014; Ni and Srinivasan, 2015).
Our research contributes first to the literature on the determinants of analyst forecast accu-
racy. Brokerage firm resources have been found to affect analyst forecast accuracy (Clement, 1999;
Kothari et al., 2016), and because of the lack of an identification strategy the sorting effect cannot
be disentangled from the total impact. Therefore, the influence on analyst forecast accuracy is
unknown. Our results not only provide the first quantitative estimates of the influence effect of the
brokerage firm but also quantify the relative importance of the influence and the sorting effects.
Second, our study contributes to the literature that uses the two-sided matching model to
understand the incentives for agents to match and the outcomes of the matching results in markets
such as the venture capital market (Sorensen, 2007a; Akkus et al., 2016a; Fox et al., 2018), the
labour market (Agarwal, 2015; Pan, 2015; Matveyev, 2016; Xia, 2018), M&A market (Park, 2013;
Akkus et al., 2016b), and the bank lending market (Chen and Song, 2013; Schwert, 2018).
The results of our study also help to understand workers’ incentives to work for firms with good
reputations, and the incentives for firms to maintain their reputations. Edmans (2011) finds that
firms with better reputations on average perform better, and our results suggest that the reputation
of a firm can serve as a sorting mechanism to attract talented employees, which is beneficial for firm
performance. More talented employees also like to work for firms with good reputations, because
they can scale their ability by using the firms’ resources and achieve better personal performance
and better future career outcomes. Our results suggest that for new analysts the influencing effect
of firms’ reputations is 2.7 times larger than the sorting effect. Therefore, the benefit of working
for high-reputation firms is particularly attractive for new workers.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the data and the OLS estimation
results are discussed. Section 3 presents the theoretical and empirical model and a discussion of
identification. Section 4 provides the estimation results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Data and OLS results
2.1 Sample selection and key variables construction
We consider new hires by brokerage firms in each year between 1996 and 2013. Our data
comes from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, which collects analysts’
earnings forecasts and recommendations for companies worldwide. We use the I/B/E/S Detail
Recommendations File to identify the brokerage firm an analyst is employed by in any given year.
The recommendation file starts in 1992 and expands its coverage over the first three years, so we
only consider analysts who started in 1996 or later. We classify an analyst as a new hire in a given
year if she appears for the first time in the dataset in that year, and stays at least for the subsequent
four years in the dataset and works for the same brokerage firm. We cross-check with the I/B/E/S
Detail Earnings History File to further exclude analysts who had previously issued any earnings
forecasts, and those who do not issue any earnings forecasts at all. We manually search for the
location of the brokerage firms and remove analysts employed by foreign broker houses that do not
have any offices in the U.S. Our final sample consists of 1,815 analysts hired by 284 brokerage firms
for the period between 1996 and 2013.
Figure 1 illustrates the geographic distribution of brokerage houses from our sample. We plot
the number of firms in each state. A clear geographic clustering on the demand side can be clearly
seen in the Northeastern states such as NY and MA, accounting for roughly 65% of our sample.
We therefore divide the analysts into 36 markets: Northeastern states and the remaining states for
18 years from 1996 to 2013. Note that pooling the other states together into one labour market
each year is less of a concern under the assumption that those small local markets are independent
of each other.16
To measure an analyst’s performance, we first determine her accuracy for each stock she covers
in a given year and then take the average of this accuracy across all coverage stocks over the
first five years of her tenure. Specifically, for analyst i making a forecast for the earnings of fiscal
year t of stock j, we compare her absolute forecast error to the average absolute forecast error
16We also run our analysis by considering all of the states as one big market in each year, and the results are
similar.
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Figure 1. Geographic distribution of brokerage firms
This figure shows the distribution of the US brokerage firms’ headquarters in different states. The darker the states, the more
brokerage firms are located in that state.
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of other analysts covering the same stock during the same time period. We rank all available
absolute forecast errors from small to large and assign a rank that corresponds to the relative
ranking of analyst i’s forecast error for that stock-year. The analyst ranked n-th (where the most





The lower the rank, the less accurate the forecast. We aggregate those accuracy ranks for analyst












where Jt denotes analyst i’s coverage in year t.
The brokerage firm prestige is measured by using Carter and Manaster (CM) ranking. This
ranking measure is based on the order of brokerage firms in firms’ IPO tombstone announcements.
The measure is developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) and extended by Carter et al. (1998) and
Loughran and Ritter (2004). We obtain the data from Jay Ritter’s website. On a scale of 0 to 9,
the higher the rank, the more prestigious the brokerage firms. Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs,
JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank, and CITI Group are among the most frequently listed in the highest
reputable brokerage groups.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our variables. The mean growth rate for these
brokerage firms is 14.5% yearly, and the median growth rate is 5%. These firms are on average
expanding through the sample period. The newly hired analysts on average start by covering
slightly more than 8 stocks, less than the average number of stocks covered by analysts in the
whole I/B/E/S universe, which is 14. Most of the analysts cover less than three different industries.
The financial analyst labour market is racially dominated by white analysts, based on the surname
search, and in our sample we classify less than 17% as nonwhite analysts. Analysts do not cluster
in the main industries they cover in our sample. The largest group of analysts (27.9% of the total
sample) cover firms in the high-tech industry, followed by 26.8% who mainly cover industries other
than those listed in the table. As over half of the U.S. publicly listed firms from 1996 to 2013 are
classified in the high-tech industry or in “other” industries, this is a reasonable assumption.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables. We consider an analyst’s tenure as her first five years working for
the brokerage firm. Broker reputation is the Carter and Manaster rank on a scale of 0 to 9, and the higher the rank the more
prestigious the brokerage firm. Broker growth is the percentage of brokerage size increase from last year. Number of stocks and
industries is the average number of firms and industries she covers during her tenure. Log(Market Cap) is the logarithm of the
total market cap an analyst covers in her first year. Ethnicity indicates whether the analyst is white Caucasian or not based on
the analyst’s surname (1 indicates not, 0 indicates yes). To include the focus industry fixed effects, we define industries using
the Fama-French five industry classifications, and classify an analyst’s focus industry as the one in which she covers the most
stocks. We indicate the following four industries: Consumer (including retails & wholesales), Manufacturing & Energy, High
Tech, and Health. Num IPO indicates the total number of IPOs made in a specific year.
N Mean St. Dev Percentile
VARIABLES 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Accuracy 1,815 0.514 0.082 0.410 0.473 0.521 0.567 0.609
Broker Reputation 1,815 5.948 3.112 0 5.001 7.001 8.501 9.001
Broker Growth 1,815 0.145 0.467 -0.181 -0.066 0.052 0.191 0.500
Log(Market Cap) 1,815 8.642 1.974 6.052 7.260 8.602 10.119 11.952
Num Stocks 1,815 8.511 4.780 2.6 5 8 11.4 14.75
Num Industries 1,815 1.683 0.771 1 1 1.5 2 2.8
Ethnicity 1,815 0.167 0.374 0 0 0 0 1
I.Consumers 1,815 0.141 0.348 0 0 0 0 1
I.Manuf & Energy 1,815 0.196 0.397 0 0 0 0 1
I.High Tech 1,815 0.279 0.449 0 0 0 1 1
I.Health 1,815 0.116 0.320 0 0 0 0 1
Num IPO 1,815 168.047 148.497 38 60 131 223 384
2.2 OLS results
In this subsection, we document a robust and strong empirical correlation between brokerage
reputation and newly hired analysts’ forecast performances. According to the level of brokerage
prestige, we first plot the correlation between brokerage prestige and analyst performance.
Figure 2 illustrates strong positive correlations between broker prestige and analysts’ accuracy
and their likelihood of becoming an all-star analyst. Analysts who start with the lowest prestige
brokerage firms on average exhibited performance of 0.493, while those who start with the highest
prestige firms on average exhibited performance of 0.522, and those analysts are on average 6%
more accurate.
To investigate these relations more formally, we estimate an OLS model for analyst accuracy.
Table 2 shows that for the entire 1996 - 2013 period, analysts work for higher prestige brokerage
firms on average have greater forecast accuracy. The magnitude does vary when we include other
broker and analyst characteristics in column (2) and market fixed effect in column (3). In column
(4) and column (5) we repeat the analysis on subsamples from 1996 - 2004 and 2005 - 2013. Here,
broker reputation is also positively correlated with analyst forecast accuracy. Overall, the positive
correlation between broker prestige and analyst forecast accuracy is robust to different controls
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Figure 2. Relation between brokerage firm prestige and analyst performance
This figure shows the correlation between brokerage firms’ reputations and newly hired analysts’ forecast accuracy from 1996 to
2013. Our sample is grouped into 10 bins according to broker prestige. The shadow area represents a 95% confidence interval.
and split sample regressions. If an analyst moves from the lowest to the highest reputable group
of brokerage firms, the analyst forecast accuracy will increase by 0.025.
In addition to broker prestige, other factors affect newly hired analyst forecast accuracy. From
Table 2, we observe that the more stocks analysts cover, the more accurate their forecasts are. This
observation may appear to contradict previous findings that the more complex the portfolios that
analysts are covering, the less accurate their forecasts are. We argue this is less of a concern because
our sample only contains newly hired analysts, so the number of stocks analysts cover also contains
information on analysts’ ability. Another critical factor explaining analyst forecast accuracy is
the ethnicity of the analyst. In the whole sample, non-white analysts constitute less than 17% of
the total sample but on average they perform better than white analysts. This outperformance
is particularly strong in the first half of the sample, possibly because sell-side analyst jobs used
to be occupied by white candidates and so the entry bar is higher for non-white candidates. For
non-white candidates to get a job, their ability must be better than average, and thus they perform
better17.
17Similar evidence has been found in the asset management industry, where the entry bar is higher for candi-
dates with low-income family backgrounds. Consequently, to become fund managers these candidates need to be
significantly better than those from wealthy families (Chuprinin and Sosyura, 2018)
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Table 2. Naive OLS Regression
This table reports estimation results of the OLS model for analyst accuracy. Columns (1) to (3) present this relationship by
using the whole sample from 1996 to 2013. Column (4) analyzes this relationship using the first half of the sample and column
(5) analyzes the relationship using the second half of the sample. Parentheses include the corresponding standard errors. ***,**,
and * denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 1.
Analyst forecasting accuracy
Whole sample 1996 - 2004 2005 - 2013
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Broker prestige 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0022** 0.0031***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Broker growth 0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0045 -0.0017
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Log(Market cap) 0.0006 0.0005 0.0020 -0.0011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Num stocks 0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.0019** 0.0013**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Num industries 0.0017 0.0022 0.0012 0.0033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Ethnicity 0.0075 0.0099* 0.0230*** 0.0016
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Num IPOs 0.0000** -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market dummy No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,815 1,815 1,815 785 1,030
R-squared 0.0088 0.0212 0.0490 0.0570 0.0458
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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As we explain in the introduction, the quality of brokerage firms becomes endogenous when
sorting and causes more reputable brokerage houses to employ analysts who are better, along with
many dimensions unobserved in the data. Analysts with better unobserved characteristics, as
captured by the error term in the regression, match with brokers of better quality. The error term
becomes positively correlated with broker size and broker accuracy, and the coefficient estimates
are biased upwards relative to the brokers’ actual influence. As no obvious instrumental variable is
independent of analyst outcome but is related to the quality of the brokerage firm employing this
analyst, we adopt the structural model developed by Sorensen (2007a) that exploits the implications
of sorting to separate sorting from influence. Sorting implies that in a market with better broker
firms, a given firm is pushed down the relative ranking and is left with worse analysts. Hence, a
broker’s new hire decisions depend on the characteristics of other agents in the market. Nevertheless,
the outcome of the analyst is independent of these other characteristics, and the other brokers’
characteristics serve as a source of exogenous variation. We now discuss the model in more detail.
3 Model
3.1 Two-sided matching model
An essential feature of the equity analyst labour market is that the matching between new
equity analysts and brokerage firms is a mutual decision, as both of the parties have the decision
power to determine whether they want to match. In addition, one analyst can only work for one
firm, but one firm can hire multiple analysts. These features are best captured by a one-to-many
two-sided matching market, which contains two types and a finite number of agents on each side
of the market. The model used in this study is similar to the variation of the college admission
model suggested by Sorensen (2007a), and shares similar assumptions: first, as discussed above,
the new equity analyst labour market is a one-to-many two-sided matching market. Second, in
one market, brokerage firms are restricted in the number of new analysts they can hire. This is
a reasonable assumption because brokerage firms’ resources limit their hiring decisions and time
invested in organising interviews. Therefore, brokerage firm hiring capacity is capped. Third, each
possible match has a valuation (V), which represents the discounted expected future payoff of the
possible matched pair, and the brokerage firm receives λ fraction of the valuation, and the analyst
expects to receive 1 − λ fraction, where λ is fixed for all possible matches in a market and thus
guarantees the model has a unique equilibrium. This assumption also rules out transfers, and is also
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reasonable. First, we do not observe analyst compensation in general. Second, most compensation
is paid in the form of a bonus, which is high when a firm’s bonus pool expands and low when it
shrinks (Groysberg et al., 2011). Therefore, analysts are sharing profits from the firm. Third, we
focus on newly hired analysts, who have little bargaining power at the beginning of their career, so
it is unlikely that these analysts can negotiate on pay. Therefore, their compensation structure is
mostly fixed, and they cannot match more reputable firms by being offered a lower profit share by
the firm.
3.1.1 Agents
The matching model has two types of agents: newly hired analysts and brokerage firms. In
market m, a set Im contains all of the new analysts, and a set Jm contains all brokerage firms
that hire analysts. Each new analyst works for one brokerage firm, and one brokerage firm can
hire a limited number of analysts. Let brokerage firm j’s quota be qj , where qj > 0. The set Mm
contains all possible matches of analysts and firms in market m, therefore Mm = Im × Jm. A
matching contains observed hirings in market m denoted as µm, where µm ⊂ Mm. Denoting that
µj contains all of the analysts firm i hires and µi is the brokerage firm analyst i works for, then a
match between firm i and analyst j can be expressed as: (i, j) ∈ µ, i = µ(j), or j ∈ µ(i).
Agents on both sides of the market choose their matched partners to maximise the matching
value, which represents the expected latent joint utility at the time of hiring. Let each possible
match have a matching value and let the value of the match i, j be denoted as Vi,j regardless of
whether i, j is a matched pair or not. The matching values are assumed to be distinct to avoid
the possibility that agents can be indifferent between two matches. The matching utility is divided
between the brokerage firms and analysts. Firms receive λ share of the matching value and the
analysts receive (1− λ) share, and λ is fixed for all matches and λ ∈ (0, 1).
3.1.2 Equilibrium
A matching is an equilibrium if it is stable and no pair of agents would like to deviate from their
current matches and form a new match together to become a blocking pair. The stable equilibrium
always exists (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and under the fixed sharing rule of the matching value
the equilibrium is unique (Sorensen, 2007a). The unique equilibrium is characterised by a set of
inequalities based on the no blocking pairs condition.
For i, j to be a stable match, we need no blocking pair to exist for i, j, that is, the opportunity
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cost of analyst i remaining match with firm j or the opportunity cost of firm j remaining match
with analyst i has to be smaller than the matching value of i, j, Vi,j .
The opportunity cost of analyst i is the maximum value that analyst i can get from the feasible
set of deviations of analyst i instead of working for the firm j. The opportunity cost of brokerage
firm j is the maximum value that firm j can get from the feasible set of deviations of firm j instead
of hiring analyst i. The fixed sharing rule means that finding the maximum value that agents on
one side of the market can get is equivalent to find the maximum matching value that a pair of
agents can achieve together. We denote OCi as the corresponding matching value for analyst i’s
opportunity cost and OCi is the corresponding matching value for brokerage firm j’s opportunity
cost. That is,
Vi,j < max[OCi, OCj ],
where
OCi ≡ max[Vi,j′ ],∀j′ ∈ J ∩ (Vi,j′ > Vµ(j′),j′),
OCj ≡ max[Vi′,j ],∀i′ ∈ I ∩ (Vi′,j > min
i′′∈µ(j)
Vi′′,j).
If in other circumstances analyst i and brokerage firm j are not matched, then (i, j) cannot
become the blocking pair for their current matches. Then it is sufficient that,
Vi,j > max[Vi,µ(i), min
i′′′∈µ(j)
Vi′′′,j ].
We denote V i,j ≡ max[OCi, OCj ], and V i,j ≡ max[Vi,µ(i),mini′′′∈µ(j) Vi′′′j ]. For µ to be a stable
matching, the following conditions need to hold:
Vi,j < V i,j ,∀(i, j) /∈ µ, (7)
Vi,j > V i,j ,∀(i, j) ∈ µ. (8)
3.2 Empirical Model
The first part of the empirical model is a matching function determining the matching value
of the match between two agents. The matching value is unobserved and modelled as a latent
variable. Without loss of generality, the matching value of analyst i and brokerage firm j can be
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written as:
Vi,j = αWi,j + ηi,j ,∀(i, j) ∈ M, (9)
where Wi,j contains characteristics of analyst i and firm j that are observed by econometricians.
ηi,j contains characteristics of analyst i and firm j that are not observed by econometricians but
are known for every agent in the market and ηi,j ∼ N(0, ση).
The second part of the model is the outcome equation. This determines the outcome of all
possible matches, which is only observable to those matches that are realised. The outcome of
analyst i and brokerage firm j can be written as:
Yi,j = αXi,j + εi,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ M, (10)
where Xi,j contains characteristics of analyst i and firm j that are observed by econometricians.
εi,j contains characteristics of analyst i and firm j that are not observed by econometricians but
known for every agent in the market and εi,j ∼ N(0, σε).18
Directly estimating the outcome equation leads to biased results, as the matching decision
between analyst i and firm j is not random but correlated with the error term in the outcome
equation, which cannot be observed by econometricians. This problem is captured by a third
equation determining the correlation between the error terms in the valuation equation and the
outcome equation:
εi,j = δηi,j + ξi,j , (11)
where ξij ∼ N(0, σξ). If there is no correlation between the two error terms then δ = 0.
3.3 Identification and estimation
In this subsection we briefly discuss how we identify and estimate the parameters in the outcome
equation. The main feature of the matching market is that the agents’ decisions on matching
interact with each other, and this leads to better-talented analysts sorting by brokerage quality. If
analyst A is hired by brokerage firm 1, then brokerage firm 2 cannot approach analyst A, simply
because A is not available anymore. Also, if brokerage firm 1 has used up its hiring quota, then
other analysts with relatively lower quality than analyst A cannot match with broker 1. Therefore,
in one market, each agent’s matching decision is correlated with other agents’ characteristics, and
also leads to better-talented analysts matching with more reputable brokerage firms.
18If the outcome is binary, there will be a third part containing a binary outcome function, i.e. Oi,j = 1[Yi,j > 0]
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The sorting and interaction feature helps in identification. As mentioned earlier, the endogeneity
problem can occur when better-talented analysts sort on brokerage firm reputation and the talent
cannot be measured or observed completely. The estimated impact from brokerage firm reputation
will then be biased upward. Sorting and interaction in the market can be viewed as we rank all of
the new analysts and all brokerage firms based on their characteristics in each market, with the top-
ranked analyst candidate matched with the top-ranked brokerage firm. We continue to match the
second highest ranked analyst candidate with the top-ranked brokerage firm until the hiring quota
is entirely filled, and then we continue to form matches between analysts with the second highest
ranked brokerage firm until we fill all of the vacancies in the market. This rank-order property
means the matching decision is determined by the relative ranking of the agents on two sides of the
market, and partly depends on the agents’ own characteristics, and partly on the characteristics
of other agents. If markets conditions vary exogenously, this will lead to similar-quality analysts
being matched with brokerage firms with different reputations for exogenous reasons, and can help
to identify the parameters in the outcome equation.
The cross-market variation means that same-quality brokerages and same-quality analysts can-
not match in two different markets. Assume in market 1, brokerage i and analyst j are matched.
In market 2, brokerage i′ has the same quality as brokerage i, but assume market 2 contains similar
brokerage firms but with more talented analysts. Therefore, an analyst j′ with the same quality
as analyst j will rank much lower in market 2, and cannot match with brokerage i′, and instead
is matched with another brokerage firm with lower quality. Brokerage house i′ can match with
another analyst k who has better quality than analyst j′. The effect from matching is different, but
the impact from the brokerage firm influence is the same, and this will lead to differences between
outputs from analyst j and analyst k. This will help us identify the effect of matching.
More formally, let Y ∗ij denote the observed match (i, j)’s outcome in one market, and then to
estimate the coefficients based on the empirical model we have:
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E[Yi,j |Xi,j ] = E[Y ∗i,j |Xi,j , (i, j) ∈ µ]
= E[Y ∗i,j |Xi,j , Vi,j > V i,j ]
= β + E[εi,j |αWi,j + ηi,j > V i,j ]
= β + E[δηi,j + ξi,j |ηi,j > V i,j − αWi,j ]
= β + δE[ηi,j |ηi,j > V i,j − αWi,j ].
The first equality comes from the equilibrium condition of the matching model, and the fourth
equality comes from the error term correlation structure. Therefore, the exogenous variation in this
expression identifies outcome equation parameters β, and the expression varies with V i,j . As V i,j is
determined by the other agents’ characteristics in the market, if the allocation of the other agents
in the market is exogenously given, then the parameters in the outcome equation are identified. 19
The key identification assumption is that agents are allocated exogenously across markets, which
is reasonable because the new analyst labour market is likely to be influenced by macro or financial
industry factors instead of agents’ sort on different markets (i.e., waiting to hire later because they
know there will be better candidates one year later). Figure 3 shows that even though the average
is reasonably consistent across markets, there are significant variations of main variables within
each market, and this variation fluctuates from market to market. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
the agents are exogenously allocated across markets.
The estimation method we use is the Bayesian estimation with Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC). The sorting and interaction feature of the model makes estimation difficult. The likeli-
hood function for one pair of agents’ matching decisions also depends on the other agents’ choices,
so all of the error terms must be integrated simultaneously. To circumvent this high-dimensional
integration problem, we take advantage of the Bayesian method with MCMC (Tanner and Wong,
1987; Geweke et al., 1994; Albert and Chib, 1993), and instead of solving the integration problem,
we augment the observed data with the simulated value of the latent matching value and the per-
formance of the counterfactual matches. The simulated distribution converges to the augmented
posterior distribution. The detailed simulation procedure can be found in Appendix A.
19A complete discussion of the identification strategy can be found in Sorensen (2007b).
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Figure 3. Variation in main variables across markets
This figure shows the cross and within market variation of the key Y variable: analyst forecast accuracy, and the key X variable:
broker reputation. Each subgraph depicts the average of the variable (black solid line) and one standard deviation around the
mean (light blue error bar). Subgraph (a) shows the variation of analyst accuracy across different markets. Subgraph (b) shows
the variation of brokerage reputation across different markets.
(a) Analyst forecast accuracy (b) Broker reputation
4 Estimation results
4.1 Main result
In this section, we estimate the structural model. In Table 3 Panel B, the coefficients estimated
represent agents’ preferences. The results show that an analyst prefers to work for brokerage
firms with higher reputations and higher growth rates, and brokerage firms prefer to hire analysts
who can cover large value portfolios, cover fewer stocks, have less industry focus, and are from
a non-white background. Thus, firms prefer non-white analysts who can cover a limited amount
of large firms and span less industries. The probability of an analyst match with a broker with
the highest reputation score is 90.6%. The probability that brokerage firms prefer a non-white
analyst is 55.13%. Compared with a new analyst who can only cover the lowest ten percentile of
the portfolio market size, brokerage firms prefer analysts who cover the top ten percentile of the
portfolio market size by a probability of 59.5%. Overall, the results from the matching equation
suggest analysts have strong preferences in terms of broker reputation, rather than other observed
factors that brokerage firms have on analysts. Broker reputation is the most important factor
in measuring brokerage firms’ quality, while the analysts’ ethnicity or portfolio sizes are simply
indirect measures of their quality.
Panel C of Table 3 represents the effect of sorting on unobserved characteristics. If there is
no sorting between unobservables, a matching model is not needed. The result shows δ is positive
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Table 3. Bayesian estimate of the matching model and the outcome equation
This table reports Bayesian estimation results of two equations from the structure model. The dependent variable in the outcome
equation is analyst forecast accuracy, and the dependent variable in the valuation equation is the latent matching value. A
detailed description of the variables is given in Table 1. Mean, Median, and Standard Dev. are the statistics of the simulated
posterior distributions of the parameters. Marginal effects of the valuation equation represent the probability of choosing two
matches with only marginal change in one variable, and are calculated by following Sorensen (2007a). Estimates are based on
110,000 simulations of the posterior distribution. The initial 11,000 simulations are discarded for burn-in. ***,**,and * denote
that zeros are not contained in the 10%, 5%, and 1% credible intervals, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Analyst forecasting accuracy
Mean Median Marginal effect Standard Dev. 95% HPD
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Outcome equation
Broker reputation 0.0019*** 0.0019 0.0007 [ 0.0006, 0.0033 ]
Broker growth -0.0044 -0.0044 0.0043 [ -0.0130, 0.0041 ]
Log(Market cap) -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0011 [ -0.0024, 0.0019 ]
Num stocks 0.0013*** 0.0013 0.0005 [ 0.0004, 0.0022 ]
Num industry -0.0031 -0.0031 0.0027 [ -0.0084, 0.0023 ]
Ethnicity 0.0036 0.0037 0.0052 [ -0.0070, 0.0140 ]
Num IPO 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0001 [ -0.0000, 0.0001 ]
Panel B: Matching equation
Broker reputation 0.1439*** 0.1409 0.0406 0.0261 [ 0.0974, 0.1952 ]
Broker growth 0.0651 0.0663 0.0184 0.1219 [ -0.1732, 0.3010 ]
Log(Market cap) 0.0569*** 0.0560 0.0161 0.0149 [ 0.0284, 0.0868 ]
Num stocks -0.0095 -0.0091 -0.0027 0.0068 [ -0.0233, 0.0034 ]
Num industry -0.1763*** -0.1753 -0.0497 0.0316 [ -0.2381, -0.1145 ]
Ethnicity 0.1820*** 0.1786 0.0513 0.0664 [ 0.0556, 0.3115 ]
Panel C: Variance
δ 0.0063*** 0.0063 0.0037 [ 8.89e-07, 0.0131 ]
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and 0 is not contained in the 99% highest posterior distribution, and that the sorting effect exists
and is significant, indicating that unobserved agents’ characteristics affect matching values and also
matching outcomes. This also highlights the key point of the study: controlling for matching is
crucial given its significant effect.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients in the outcome equation after controlling
for endogenous matching. The coefficient associated with broker reputation is positive and 0 is not
contained in the 95% highest posterior distribution, which suggests after controlling for sorting,
the effect of brokerage reputation is crucial in explaining analyst forecast accuracy. This finding
is consistent with channels suggested by Clement (1999) that brokerage resources (proxied by
brokerage reputation in this study) are important in determining analyst forecast accuracy.
4.2 Relative importance
Although the above analysis clearly shows that broker reputation has a significant direct impact
on analyst forecast accuracy, because sorting on unobservables also has a significant impact on the
outcome, the relative importance of the direct effect of broker reputation, and the indirect effect
from sorting is unknown..
In determining the relative importance, we compare the OLS and Bayesian estimated results in
Table 4. Column (1) presents the OLS regression results, and column (2) the Bayesian estimation
results. From these two columns, the total impact of broker reputation on analyst forecast accuracy
estimated by OLS regression is 0.0026, and the direct impact of broker reputation on analyst forecast
accuracy is 0.0019. The direct impact takes 73% of the total impact, and thus the remainder is
the sorting effect. In column (4), we calculate and test whether the average sorting effect is
statistically significant. The magnitude of the average sorting effect on broker reputation is 0.0007,
which represents 27% of the average total impact, and it is statistically different from 0. Although
the absolute value of the sorting effect is small, the economic magnitude is huge. By comparing
two similar quality analysts matched with two distinct brokerage firms, where one belongs to
the lowest reputable group and the other to the highest reputable group, the difference in analyst
forecast accuracy is found to be 0.007, which represents 15 years’ working experience for the average
analyst. Thus, although the sorting effect does not represent the majority of the total impact of
broker reputation, it is still huge in economic terms and should therefore be considered.
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Table 4. Bayesian estimate of alternative market and comparison
This table compares the outcome equations from models with different market definitions and compares the coefficient estimated
from the naive OLS regression for analyst accuracy. Bayesian estimates are based on 110,000 simulations of the posterior
distribution. The initial 11,000 simulations are discarded for burn-in and a tune-in factor of 10. Parentheses represent the
corresponding t-statistics. ***,**,and * denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined
as in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Analyst forecasting accuracy
OLS Bayesian estimation Difference with OLS
Main Expended states Main Expended states
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Broker reputation 0.0026 0.0019 0.0019 0.0007** 0.0007**
(2.3459) (2.3459)
Broker growth -0.0032 -0.0044 -0.0004 0.0012 -0.0028
(0.5741) (-1.3397)
Log(Market cap) 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 0.0005
(1.4906) (0.8518)
Num stocks 0.0015 0.0013 0.0009 0.0002 0.0006***
(0.9377) (2.8132)
Num industry 0.0022 -0.0031 -0.0034 0.0053*** 0.0056***
(5.3979) (5.7035)
Ethnicity 0.0099 0.0036 -0.0031 0.0063*** 0.0130***
(2.6854) (5.5420)
Num IPO -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(-9.5108) (-9.5108)
δ 0.0063 0.0074
Markets 36 36 18
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4.3 Alternative market
In our main analysis, our definition of new analyst labour market is by one calendar year but
segregated by geographical locations. The market segregation is a critical identification assumption,
and will fail if new analyst candidates or brokerage firms choose to participate in the specific market,
based on unobserved characteristics of other agents in that market. For example, if the Northeast
of the US has more reputable brokerage firms and if that reputation is sufficient to attract analyst
candidates, this will lead to analysts sorting between different locations, and so a more appropriate
definition of the market is to consider the whole US as a single market.
In this subsection, we expand the market definition to evaluate the robustness of the estimation
results. In Column (3) of Table 4, we treat the Northeast and the rest of the US as the same market
and repeat the analysis. The estimated coefficients are at a similar magnitude and significance level,
particularly the key variables of broker reputation and δ. The magnitude of the coefficient associated
with broker reputation is robust to different specifications and the statistical significance is also
similar. The magnitude of δ increases but the statistical significance is similar. This indicates that
minor sorting exists between the geographical locations in the same year, but the baseline Bayesian
estimation does not capture this minor effect. For our main purpose of estimating the direct effect
of broker reputation, this is less of a concern because this cross-location sorting appears to have
little correlation with broker reputation. Overall, the results provide an intuitive robustness test
that confirms that the identification assumption is valid and our estimation results are not sensitive
to different market definitions.
5 Conclusion
Our study focuses on the new analyst labour market. We find new analysts working for firms
with higher reputations perform better. This total effect is a combination of the direct influence
effect, in which reputable firms can help analysts perform better, and the sorting effect, in which
brokerage firms with high reputations can attract more talented analysts. To disentangle these
two effects, we utilise a one-to-many two-sided matching model to circumvent the need to find
the instrumental variable. The features of the matching model can capture how agents’ matching
decisions interact, and how the other agents’ characteristics determine the relative ranking of the
agents’ matching decisions, but the other agents’ characteristics do not have an effect on the agents’
performance. Therefore, the exogenous variation of the other agents’ characteristics helps to identify
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the coefficients of the outcome equation.
In the sample of 1815 new analyst-brokerage firm matched pairs from 1996 to 2013, we find
that both the influence effect and the sorting effect have a significant impact on analyst forecast
accuracy. The influence effect accounts for 73% of the total impact, and the sorting effect for 27%.
The results of the study have more general implications for understanding the incentives for
workers to choose more reputable firms to work for and the incentives for firms to spend resources
in maintaining their reputation. High reputation firms provide resources for workers and help them
perform better, and in our results the forecast difference between analysts of the same quality
working for the lowest and the highest reputation firms is equivalent to 15 years of experience.
A firm’s reputation is valuable, as it not only motivates current workers but also attracts more
talented new workers. Both of these effects are important in understanding the benefit of firms’
reputation on workers performances.
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A Appendix: MCMC estimation procedure
Let the markets be indexed by m = 1, . . . , N , latent valuation variables be Vm ≡ {Vij , ij ∈
Mm}, matching characteristics Wm ≡ {Wij , ij ∈ Mm}, and exogenous explanatory variables be
Xm ≡ {Xij , ij ∈ Mm}, for all potential matches ij ∈ Mm in each market m. The following
algorithm shows how to draw from the posterior the distribution of the parameters augmented
with the latent valuation variable, Vij , and the missing observations y∗ij for unobserved matches.
We are interested in estimating the parameters α, β, and δ. The Markov chain is generated by
drawing each individual dimension of the joint posterior distribution conditional on the draws of
the other dimensions as follows:
1. Start Gibbs-sampler for g = 1 : Gburn−in +Gsample total runs.
2. Initialise the sampling by drawing α, β, δ, and σ2ξ from prior distributions: α ∼ N(α0, A−1α =
10Ik), β ∼ N(β0, A−1β = 10Ip), δ|σ2ξ ∼ N(δ0, σ2ξ/Aδ), and σ2ξ ∼ IG(a = 2.1, b = 1).
3. Draw latent valuation variables Vij for all potential matches in each market m, and draw
outcome variable Yij for unobserved matches in each market m, from distributions conditional
on parameters α, β, δ, σ2ξ .
4. Update α, β by drawing from a Bayesian Seemingly Unrelated Regression (BSUR) of [V ;Y ]
on [W ;X] conditional on δ, σ2ξ .
5. Update δ, σ2ξ by drawing from a Bayesian regression of Y −Xβ on V −Wα, conditional on
α, β.
6. Go back to step 3 and repeat.
We now describe how to draw from each conditional distribution.
A.1 Conditional distribution of valuation variables Vij
The conditional augmented posterior distribution of Vij depends on whether brokerage firm i
and analyst j are matched or not:
1. when ij /∈ µm, we draw Vij from N(W ′ijα, 1) truncated from above at V ij ;
2. when ij ∈ µm, we draw Vij from
Vij |α, β, δ, σ2ξ , Yij ∼ N
(








truncated from below at V ij .
The expressions for V ij and V ij are given in the equation.
A.2 Conditional distribution of unobserved outcome variables Yij
We only need to simulate the outcome variable Yij if ij /∈ µm, i.e., for unobserved matches. We
draw Yij from
Yij |α, β, δ, σ2ξ , Vij ∼ N
(
X ′ijβ + δ(Vij −W ′ijα), σ2ξ
)
.
A.3 Conditional distribution of α and β
We apply a BSUR of [V; Y] on [W;X] to sample α and β,























δ δ2 + σ2ξ
 .
A.4 Conditional distribution of δ and σ2ξ
Draw δ, σ2xi|α, β, V, Y from a Bayesian regression of ε = Y −Xβ on η = V −Wα:
1. Draw σ2ξ ∼ IG(a+N, b+S), where N is the number of all potential matches from all markets,
and S = (ε− ηd)′(ε− ηd) + (d− δ0)′Aδ(d− δ0), and d = (η′η +Aδ)−1(η′ε+Aδδ0).






, truncated from below at 0.
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Summary
This thesis investigates three questions relates to CEOs and financial analysts: (1) What are
the impact of lame-duck CEOs on firms performances? (2) What is the relative importance of
incentive pay’s incentive effect and selection effect on CEO performance? (3) What is the relative
importance of brokerage firm reputation’s sorting effect and influence effect on analysts forecast
accuracy?
Chapter 2 shows that the protracted succession is common in U.S. S&P 1500 firms. Among
1739 CEO turnovers from 2005 to 2014, 31% of them are experiencing the protracted succession
form of match friction. In protracted successions, firms announce incumbent CEOs’ leaving news
without identifying successors’ name, and then incumbent CEOs become lame-ducks. The average
period of the protracted succession lasts for six months. During this period, a monthly rebalanced
long-only portfolio add firm into the portfolio when the successors’ identity has not been publicly
announced and sale firm when the successor is publicly known. This portfolio generates monthly 4-
factor alpha of 11%. Moreover, during the reign of lame-duck CEOs, firms also experience positive
abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements. This positive market reaction is likely
to be driven by two mechanisms: Investors under-react to the lack of new of new CEO identify and
the underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament competition among CEO candidates.
The task in chapter 3 is trying to distinguish between the two forces that will lead to new
CEOs receive higher incentive pay performance better. The two forces are direct incentive effect
that higher incentive pay motivates CEOs to work harder and firms perform better, and selection
effect that better-talented CEOs are matched with firms provide higher incentive pay and leads to
better firm performance. This chapter utilizes a one-to-one two-sided matching model to control for
the selection effect and identify the incentive effect. This method takes advantage of the fact that
agents matching decisions not only depend on their own characteristics but also on other agents
characteristics in the market, these other agents characteristics are not likely to impact on matched
pairs’ performance. The exogenous variation on agents’ characteristics in different markets helps to
disentangle the incentive and selection effect of CEO incentive pay. The incentive effect accounts
for 83% of the total impact and the selection effect accounts for 17% of the total impact. The
selection effect becomes more important in industries where talent mobilities are higher and in
more recent years.
Chapter 4 uses a similar approach in chapter 3 to understand the impact of brokerage firm’s
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reputation on financial analysts’ forecast accuracy. On one hand, brokerage firms with high repu-
tation are always associated with better research support, better opportunity to communicate with
the management team, and these resources can help analysts to forecast better (influence effect).
On the other hand, better reputable brokerage firms attract better-talented analysts to work for
them, therefore forecast better (sorting effect). This chapter uses a one-to-many two-sided match-
ing model to identify the influence effect and the sorting effect. The result shows that the incentive




Dit proefschrift onderzoekt drie vragen met betrekking tot CEO’s en financiële analisten: (1)
Wat zijn de gevolgen van CEO’s van lamé-eenden voor de prestaties van bedrijven? (2) Wat is
het relatieve belang van het stimulerende effect van het stimuleringsbeleid en het selectie-effect
op de prestaties van de CEO? (3) Wat is het relatieve belang van de sorteringseffecten en het
invloedseffect van makelaarsfirma’s op de nauwkeurigheid van voorspellingen van analisten?
Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat de langdurige opvolging gebruikelijk is in Amerikaanse S&P 1500-
kantoren. Van 1739 CEO-omzet van 2005 tot 2014 ervaart 31% de langdurige opvolgingsvorm
van match-frictie. In langdurige opvolgingen kondigen bedrijven aan dat zittende CEO’s nieuwt-
jes achterlaten zonder de naam van de opvolger te identificeren, en dan worden zittende CEO’s
lamé-eenden. De gemiddelde duur van de langdurige opvolging duurt zes maanden. Gedurende
deze periode voegt een maandelijkse, opnieuw gebalanceerde, lange portefeuille de onderneming
toe aan de portefeuille wanneer de identiteit van de opvolger niet openbaar is aangekondigd en de
verkooporganisatie niet bekend is wanneer de opvolger publiek bekend is. Deze portfolio genereert
maandelijks 4-factor alfa van 11%. Bovendien ervaren bedrijven tijdens de regering van CEO’s van
lamme eendjes ook positieve abnormale rendementen in verband met aankondigingen van inkom-
sten. Deze positieve marktreactie zal waarschijnlijk worden aangedreven door twee mechanismen:
beleggers reageren onvoldoende op het ontbreken van nieuwe CEO’s en identificeren de positieve
effecten van de toernooicompetitie onder CEO-kandidaten.
De taak in hoofdstuk 3 probeert een onderscheid te maken tussen de twee krachten die ertoe
zullen leiden dat nieuwe CEO’s hogere prikkelprestaties beter ontvangen. De twee krachten hebben
een direct stimulerend effect dat hogere prikkelbeloningen bestuurders motiveren harder te werken
en bedrijven beter presteren, en selectie-effect dat beter getalenteerde CEO’s gepaard gaan met
bedrijven hogere prikkelbeloningen bieden en leiden tot betere bedrijfsprestaties. Dit hoofdstuk
maakt gebruik van een één-op-één model voor tweezijdige matching om het selectie-effect te con-
troleren en het stimulerende effect te identificeren. Deze methode maakt gebruik van het feit dat
agents die beslissingen matchen niet alleen afhankelijk zijn van hun eigen kenmerken, maar ook van
andere kenmerken van agenten in de markt, en dat deze andere kenmerken van agenten waarschi-
jnlijk niet van invloed zijn op de prestaties van overeenkomende paren. De exogene variatie op de
kenmerken van agents in verschillende markten helpt om het incentive- en selectie-effect van CEO
incentive-beloning te ontwarren. Het stimulerend effect is goed voor 83% van de totale impact en
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het selectie-effect vertegenwoordigt 17% van de totale impact. Het selectie-effect wordt belangrijker
in bedrijfstakken waar talentmobiliteiten hoger zijn en in recentere jaren.
Hoofdstuk 4 gebruikt een vergelijkbare aanpak in hoofdstuk 3 om inzicht te krijgen in de im-
pact van de reputatie van beursvennootschappen op de nauwkeurigheid van de voorspellingen van
financiële analisten. Enerzijds worden beursvennootschappen met een hoge reputatie altijd geasso-
cieerd met betere onderzoeksondersteuning, betere mogelijkheden om met het managementteam te
communiceren en deze bronnen kunnen analisten helpen voorspellen wat beter is (invloedseffect).
Aan de andere kant trekken beter gereputeerde beursvennootschappen analisten aan die beter in
staat zijn om voor hen te werken en daarom beter voorspellen (sorteringseffect). In dit hoofdstuk
wordt een één-op-veelzijdig model voor tweezijdig matchen gebruikt om het invloedseffect en het
sorteringseffect te identificeren. Het resultaat toont aan dat het stimulerend effect 73% van de
totale impact uitmaakt en dat het sorteringseffect goed is voor 27% van de totale impact.
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